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1. INTRODUCTION: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE PERSPECTIVE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
Some sixteen years ago, I undertook to explore the Establishment
Clause from the perspective of constitutional litigation.' My purpose in
doing so was to respond to what, at that time, had been extensive and
ongoing academic criticism of the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and of its decisions under that jurisprudence. 2 A
common thread running through this criticism was that the Court had
failed to develop and articulate an underlying theory as to the meaning of
the Establishment Clause and its function in our constitutional system.3
1. Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of
Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1317 (1997). This lengthy law review
article was the subject of a symposium hosted by the Wayne Law Review. The
contributors to the symposium, who commented on my article, were Professor Jesse H.
Choper, The Unpredictability of the Supreme Court's Doctrine in Establishment Clause
Cases, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1439 (1997); Professor John H. Garvey, The Architecture of
the Establishment Clause, 43 WAYNE L. REv. 1451 (1997); and Professor William
Marshall, The Limits of an Establishment Clause "Restatement": A Response to
Professor Sedler, 43 WAYNE L. REv. 1465 (1997).
2. Sedler, supra note 1, at 1317. At that time, the amount of academic commentary
on the Establishment Clause, and on the Religion Clauses in general, had been enormous.
Although the focus of the article was on the operation of the Establishment Clause in
practice, in the article, I examined at least a portion of the voluminous academic
commentary at some length and tried to obtain an understanding of some aspects of the
academic debate. Although I had little interest in joining in that debate and did not do so,
I did cite a number of academic writings when they seemed relevant.
3. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court
and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 496-97 (1986).
The Court's inconsistency pervades more than just the results of the cases;
the Court has also wavered constantly in its depiction of the underlying theory
of the [E]stablishment [C]lause. At times[,] the Court has indicated the clause
mandates a wall of separation between church and state. At other times, the
Court has stated that neutrality is required. In still other instances, the Court has
spoken of accommodation.
It is, then, no wonder that establishment jurisprudence has been universally
criticized. The Court itself has acknowledged its own "considerable internal
inconsistency" [quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970)], candidly admitting that it has "sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for
flexibility" [quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980)], and commentators have found the area hopelessly
confused.
Id. at 496-97 (footnotes omitted).
Academic commentary on the underlying theory of the Establishment Clause has
continued apace. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A
Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1843 (2006); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of
the Local in Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1810
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Much of the criticism of the Court's approach to the Establishment
Clause related to the Court's use of the "Lemon test" 4 as the articulated
methodology to resolve all of the Establishment Clause issues coming
before it for review. This criticism regarding the Lemon test had
surfaced among Justices of the Court itself.6
I had, and continue to have, a very different view of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and its decisions under that
jurisprudence. In the earlier article, I developed fully my view of the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and it was very different
from the view of most of the academic commentators at that time. Most
of the academic commentators approached the Establishment Clause
(2004); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 346 (2002).
4. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
5. According to one commentator, the Lemon test is "irrelevant or indeterminate
when applied to most serious establishment issues." Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 685, 686 (1992). Another commentator argued that the broad disagreements about
the meaning and viability of the Lemon test have rendered the test "only an imperfect tool
for enforcing the separation principle" and have "produced an area of law that is chaotic
and almost entirely unpredictable." Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the
Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 467, 469.
One of the most prominent Establishment Clause commentators, Professor Jesse
Choper, had set forth a comprehensive theory as to the meaning of the Establishment
Clause that would reshape completely the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and redefine the function of the Establishment Clause in terms of "securing religious
liberty." JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION IN THE RELIGION CLAUSES 35 (1995). Under Professor Choper's thesis,
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, taken together, would be
interpreted in light of four principles: the deliberate disadvantage principle, the
burdensome effect principle, the intentional disadvantage principle, and the independent
impact principle. Id. Applying these principles to the Court's decided cases, Professor
Choper would reach dramatically different results from those reached by the Court,
sometimes finding an Establishment Clause violation when the Court did not, and
sometimes finding no violation when the Court did. Id.
6. See generally Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I agree with the long list of constitutional
scholars who have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the ... crooked lines and wavering
shapes its intermittent use has produced"); see also Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (noting that "[p]ersuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged"); see also
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that "this action once
again illustrates certain difficulties inherent in the Court's use of the [Lemon] test" and
that there is a "tension in the Court's use of the Lemon test to evaluate an Establishment
Clause challenge to government efforts to accommodate the free exercise of religion");
see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Lemon test has "not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment
Clause cases").
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from a truly academic perspective. They were searching for an
underlying theory of the Establishment Clause that would provide
answers to all Establishment Clause questions within the analytical
framework of that underlying theory and that would produce results
consistent with the premises on which the theory was based. My view of
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, to the contrary, was not
based on the search for an underlying theory or on the perceived absence
of such a theory in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Rather, my view had been formed by my experience as a constitutional
litigator in litigating and advising on Establishment Clause issues and in
trying to bring this experience to bear in explaining the Establishment
Clause to my students.7
It was my submission that when one looked at the Establishment
Clause from the perspective of constitutional litigation, it was indeed
possible to ascertain what I referred to as the "law of the Establishment
Clause." The "law of the Establishment Clause" is not at all difficult to
understand or to apply to the resolution of the Establishment Clause
issues that in fact arise in practice. It is the "law of the Establishment
Clause" that is used by litigating lawyers and by the courts-including
the Supreme Court-to litigate and resolve these issues.
The purpose of the writing then was to explain the nature and
operation of the "law of the Establishment Clause." I contended that the
"law of the Establishment Clause" consists of four components. First,
there is an overriding principle: the Establishment Clause commands
complete official neutrality toward religion. Second, there are three
operative principles: the three prongs of the Lemon test. Third, there are a
number of subsidiary doctrines, mostly relating to the application of the
second Lemon "effect of advancing religion" prong. Fourth, and most
importantly in practice, there are the Court's precedents in what I
identified as the five major areas of Establishment Clause litigation: (1)
religious practices in the public schools; (2) financial aid or
governmental benefits to religion; (3) governmental action purportedly
"advancing religion"; (4) "entanglement" or governmental interference
in religious matters; and (5) preference for religion or between religions,
which includes governmental action to protect the religious freedom of
individuals or institutions.8
7. See generally ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir.) (involving
holiday season displays), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986); Doe v. City of Clawson, 915
F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1990) (involving holiday season displays); Stein v. Plainwell Cmty.
Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987) (involving prayer at high school commencements).
At that time, I had litigated cases involving holiday season displays.
8. Sedler, supra note 1, at 1322-24.
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The "law of the Establishment Clause" then and now is found in the
Establishment Clause cases decided by the Supreme Court and in the
Court's opinions setting forth its reasons for deciding those cases as it
did. As in other areas of constitutional law, the "law of the Establishment
Clause" has developed in a line of growth through the process of
constitutional litigation.9 Because the process of constitutional litigation
consists of case-by-case adjudication of specific issues, it is not a process
that readily lends itself to the development of a comprehensive
underlying theory or broad, general propositions. 0 Rather, in its case-by-
case adjudication of specific Establishment Clause issues, the Court has
promulgated principles and doctrines and has established precedents.
These principles, doctrines, and precedents are applied in subsequent
cases, in which they may undergo some degree of refinement and
modification. The precedents build on each other and form a "cluster of
precedents" in the different Establishment Clause areas. The Court draws
upon these "clusters of precedents" whenever a new issue arises in a
particular area, and the precedents, supplemented when necessary by
applicable principles and doctrines, provide the parameters for the
resolution of the new Establishment Clause issue before the Court.
The "law of the Establishment Clause," as it existed at the time of
my earlier article, had been developing for almost fifty years." During
this time, a large number of specific Establishment Clause issues had
been resolved by the Court, "clusters of precedents" had been created in
all of the major areas of Establishment Clause litigation, and principles
and doctrines had been promulgated, refined, and applied in a number of
contexts. As a result, it was my submission that the "law of the
Establishment Clause" could be considered to be fairly settled and that
9. See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033,
1054-55 (1979) (discussing the development of constitutional law in a line of growth);
see also Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 118-20 (1983).
10. In their demand that the Supreme Court formulate a comprehensive underlying
theory and promulgate broad, general propositions of constitutional law, academic
commentators may sometimes lose sight of the fact that the Court's constitutional
jurisdiction is limited to deciding the "case or controversy" before it and that the Court is
supposed to decide constitutional issues on the "narrowest possible ground." As the Court
has stated, a constitutional ruling should not be formulated "in broader terms than are
required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied." Rescue Army v. Mun.
Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 571, n.37 (1947). Thus, in an Establishment Clause case
coming before the Court, the Court's focus is properly on the resolution of the particular
Establishment Clause issue presented rather than on the formulation of a comprehensive
underlying theory or the promulgation of broad, general principles of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
11. The Court's modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence is considered to have
begun with Everson v. Board ofEducation ofEwing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
593
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
new Establishment Clause issues that would arise would be litigated and
resolved within the analytical framework of the existing principles,
doctrines, and precedents.
In the present Article, I propose to revisit the "law of the
Establishment Clause" in light of the Establishment Clause cases decided
by the Supreme Court in the intervening sixteen years. The most salient
feature emerging from this revisit is that there are now relatively few
Establishment Clause cases coming before the Court. In the 15-year
period between 1997 and the end of the Court's last Term in 2012, I have
only counted seven cases in which the Supreme Court decided an
Establishment Clause issue, including the Court's most recent decision,
which was based on both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. Two of these cases involved financial aid to religion. In both
cases, a Court majority held that the particular form of financial aid-in
one case, the inclusion of parochial school students with public school
students in the loan of computers and other instructional materials,12 and
in the other, the inclusion of vouchers for tuition at parochial schools
along with other financial assistance for the parents of children attending
underperforming public schools' 3 -did not violate the Establishment
Clause. In two other cases, decided the same day, involving public
displays that included the Ten Commandments, the Court held 5-4 that
one display violated the Establishment Clause,14 while the other display
did not." In the fifth case, the Court held violative of the Establishment
Clause a school district's policy authorizing a student election to
determine whether the student body wanted to have a student deliver a
"brief invocation and/or message" at varsity football games.' 6 In the sixth
case, the Court upheld, against an Establishment Clause challenge, a
provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA) 17 providing that "'[n]o government shall impose a
substantial burden on ... a person residing in . . . an institution,' unless
12. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
13. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
14. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). After a federal court
held that a county's display of the Ten Commandments, standing alone, violated the
Establishment Clause, the county expanded the display to include eight other documents.
Id. at 856. These documents had either a religious theme or were excerpted to highlight a
religious element, such as the Preamble to the Constitution and the Mayflower Compact.
See id. at 856-57.
15. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (involving a display of a donated
monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds
along with seventeen monuments and historical markers commemorating the "people,
ideals, and events that compose Texan identity").
16. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306 (2000).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)(1) to (2) (2000).
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the burden furthers 'a compelling governmental interest,' and does so by
the 'least restrictive means."" 8
In the seventh and most recent case, the Court applied both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause to find a "ministerial
exception" to federal civil rights laws that precluded the application of
those laws to invalidate the dismissal of a teacher at a private religious
school who had been given the status of a religious official by the
denomination operating the school. 19 This was the extent of
Establishment Clause decisions by the Supreme Court in a fifteen-year
period.2 0 As will be pointed out subsequently, the Court's decisions in all
18. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
1(a)(1) to (2)). The provision was invoked by prison inmates who contended that the
prison was interfering with their religious freedom by denying them the ability to hold
religious services. Id. at 712-13. The state argued unsuccessfully that this required
"accommodation" for religious freedom amounted to an unconstitutional preference for
religion. Id. at 713.
19. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (holding that the application of the employment
discrimination provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq., to invalidate the dismissal of the teacher at this school would violate both the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause). In cases such as this, the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause operate in tandem. The interference with religious
freedom violates the Free Exercise Clause, and the involvement of the state in the
teaching personnel decisions of a religious school is an unconstitutional entanglement
with religion and so violates the Establishment Clause as well.
20. The Court also dismissed some Establishment Clause claims on standing or
related grounds in three cases. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 549 U.S.
1109 (2007) (holding that a federal taxpayer did not have standing to bring a taxpayer's
suit to challenge the President's issuance of an executive order to ensure that faith-based
community organizations would be able to apply for federal financial support for
activities that were not inherently religious); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (holding that the non-custodial parent did not have standing,
over objections of the custodial parent, to assert a challenge that daily classroom
recitation by the children's teacher of the Pledge of Allegiance with the words "Under
God," added in 1954 by Congress, violated the Establishment Clause); see also Salazar v.
Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010) (holding, 5-4, on standing grounds and rules pertaining to
injunctions that a federal court could not order removal of a Latin cross placed on a
federal preserve in 1934 to honor American soldiers who had died in World War 1, when
Congress had dealt with the matter by legislation and had directed the Secretary of the
Interior to transfer land with the cross to a veteran's organization in exchange for
privately owned land elsewhere in the preserve).
During this time, apart from the decision in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court decided
only one other Free Exercise case, holding that a state did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause by excluding students who were pursuing a devotional theology degree from a
state scholarship program for college students. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
For the upcoming 2013 Term, the Court has granted certiorari in an Establishment
Clause case involving the process by which a legislative body selects members of the
clergy to deliver "legislative prayer." Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir.
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of these cases involved the Court's application of the components of the
"law of the Establishment Clause." The "law of the Establishment
Clause," to which we will now turn, remains fully viable as an
explanation of the analytical framework under which the Court decides
Establishment Clause cases.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE "LAW OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE"
As stated at the outset, the "law of the Establishment Clause"
consists of four elements. First, there is an overriding principle:
the Establishment Clause commands complete official neutrality
toward religion. Second, there are three operative principles, the
three prongs of the Lemon test. Third, there are a number of
subsidiary doctrines, mostly relating to the application of the
second Lemon "effect of advancing religion" prong. Fourth, and
most importantly in practice, there are the Court's precedents in
what I identified as the five major areas of Establishment Clause
litigation: (1) religious practices in the public schools; (2)
financial aid or governmental benefits to religion; (3)
governmental action purportedly "advancing religion"; (4)
"entanglement" or governmental interference in religious
matters; and (5) preference for religion or between religions,
which includes governmental action to protect the religious
freedom of individuals or institutions.2 1
In the present Article, I discuss the components of the "law of the
Establishment Clause." This discussion will briefly summarize the more
complete discussion in the earlier article and will discuss the Court's
decisions in the last sixteen years as they relate to each component. It
should be noted that there will be some overlap in this discussion. The
overlap is necessary to maintain continuity in the discussion of each of
the components, and I have concluded that it is better to repeat some of
the discussion rather than risk a break in the continuity.
A. The Overriding Principle: Complete Official Neutrality
The overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is that the
Establishment Clause commands complete official neutrality toward
religion. The government cannot favor religion over non-religion, and it
2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388 (2013). See infra notes 274-81 and accompanying
text.
21. Sedler, supra note 1, at 1322-24.
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cannot favor one religion over another. 2 2 The overriding principle of
complete official neutrality toward religion has replaced the earlier
concept of the Establishment Clause as creating a "wall of separation
between church and state." 2 3 Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson
pointed out the problems with the "wall of separation" concept.24 Justice
Douglas noted that while the First Amendment "reflects the philosophy
that Church and State should be separated," "[it] does not say that in
every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State."25
"Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which
there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other."2 6 The
neutrality principle furthers the "philosophy of separation" by precluding
the government from favoring religion, but at the same time, it does not
require the government to be hostile to religion. 27 Because the
Establishment Clause does not require the government to be hostile to
religion, obviously, the government can include religious institutions in
the services it provides to the public generally, such as police and fire
protection, 28 and likewise, the government can include religious
institutions among recipients of governmental funding to provide secular
services.29 In addition, the principle of complete official neutrality is not
breached when the government provides religious organizations with
equal access to governmental facilities, such as access to a public forum.
This being so, such equal access is required by the First Amendment
freedom of speech principle of content neutrality. 30
22. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985).
23. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 146, 164 (1879)). Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated, "In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State."' Id. (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at
164).
24. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
25. Id. at 312.
26. Id.
27. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (noting that the First "Amendment requires the state to be
a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers[] [and] does
not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to
handicap religions, than it is to favor them").
28. As Professor Laycock has noted, police and fire protection are such a universal
part of our lives that they have become part of the baseline, and to deny them to churches
would put religion outside the protection of the law. Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993,
1005 (1990).
29. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1374-76.
30. See id. at 1331-38, 1392-93; see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98 (2001) (discussing the equal access of religious speech to a designated public
forum, here the use of after-school facilities in a public school).
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The overriding principle of complete official neutrality toward
religion is as close as the Court is likely to come in formulating an
underlying theory as to the meaning of the Establishment Clause and its
function in our constitutional system. Since the function of the
Establishment Clause in our constitutional system is to promote complete
official neutrality toward religion, it follows in theory that the
constitutionality of any governmental action involving religion depends
on whether or not that action is consistent with this overriding
principle."
This overriding principle, of course, does not provide much guidance
for determining whether a particular governmental action involving
religion violates the Establishment Clause. This is the function of the
other components of the "law of the Establishment Clause." Nonetheless,
the development and application of the other components of the "law of
the Establishment Clause" are informed by the overriding principle of
complete official neutrality toward religion.
This is evident with respect to the subsidiary doctrine of the non-
discriminatory inclusion of religion. The Court has held that, at least in
some circumstances, the government does not violate the Establishment
Clause when it includes the religious with the secular in the receipt of
governmental benefits.32 At the time of the earlier article, I concluded,
"Indeed, in all of the cases coming before it, the Court, although
sometimes sharply divided, has managed to come up with a majority to
hold that providing a particular benefit to the religious as well as the
secular was constitutionally permissible."3 3 This result was also obtained
in the two later cases dealing with financial aid to religion, in which the
Court, although again divided, has held that the particular form of aid did
not violate the Establishment Clause.34 The Court now appears to be
disposed to uphold against Establishment Clause challenge any form of
governmental financial aid that includes the religious with the secular. In
this regard, since the religious is included with the secular in the receipt
of governmental benefits, such inclusion is fully consistent with the
overriding principle of complete official neutrality toward religion.
3 1. At the time of the earlier article, there had been considerable academic discussion
about the meaning of "neutrality." See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1340-41, nn.104-05.
32. See id. at 1358-59, 1390-93.
33. Id. at 1398-99.
34. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (considering the inclusion of parochial
school students with public school students in the loan of computers and other
instructional materials); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (considering
the inclusion of vouchers for tuition at parochial schools along with other financial
assistance for the parents of children attending underperforming public schools).
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B. The Operational Principles: The Lemon Test
Under the Lemon test, in order for governmental action to be upheld
under the Establishment Clause, (1) the action must have a secular
legislative purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect must be neither to
advance nor inhibit religion, and (3) it may not foster "excessive
government entanglement with religion." 3 5 From the perspective of
constitutional litigation, the Lemon test is best understood as comprising
three operational principles reflecting "the cumulative criteria developed
by the Court over many years." 36 When understood from this
perspective, the Lemon test is not a talismanic test or even a
comprehensive mode of analysis that by itself can be used to resolve all
Establishment Clause issues arising in practice. The Lemon test simply
sets forth three operational principles, which serve as a point of departure
for Establishment Clause analysis. The application of the Lemon
operational principles incorporates the subsidiary doctrines that have
emerged from the Court's decisions in the major areas of Establishment
Clause litigation. 37 In the earlier article, I said that the widespread
academic dissatisfaction with the Lemon test at that time38 resulted from
the failure of most academic commentators to understand or accept the
limited scope of the test in actual litigation. In actual litigation, the test
does nothing more than set forth three operational principles that interact
with subsidiary doctrines and precedents to provide the parameters for
the resolution of the particular Establishment Clause issue before the
Court.39
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
36. Id. at 612. Professor Van Alstyne said that the first two Lemon elements were
taken from Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and that the third element was
taken from Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See William Van
Alstyne, What Is 'An Establishment ofReligion '?, 65 N.C. L. REv. 909, 909 n.2 (1987).
37. As of 1997, in every post-Lemon case, save one, the Court expressly (although
with some disagreement by particular Justices) applied the Lemon test to the resolution of
the Establishment Clause issue before it. The sole and glaring exception was Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), in which the Court employed a strictly historical
"framers' intent" interpretation and concluded that the framers did not intend for the
Establishment Clause to prohibit legislative prayer. The Court's aberrational "framers'
intent" interpretation of the Establishment Clause in Marsh means that Marsh will have
little if any extendibility as a precedent. See infra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
38. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1319-20.
39. Id. at 1344. One of the few academic commentators who saw utility in the Lemon
test was Professor Daniel 0. Conkle. Professor Conkle stated,
Whatever its precise formulation, the essence of Lemon is a context-specific
inquiry that requires the exercise of judgment. The Court must examine the
government's purpose and the effect of its action, as well as the resulting
relationship between religion and government. It must consider the degree to
which the government is engaged in favoring or endorsing particular religious
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1. The "Religious Purpose" Principle
Under the "religious purpose" principle, any governmental action
taken solely for the purpose of advancing religion is unconstitutional.
Whenever the government takes action solely for the purpose of
advancing religion, the existence of this improper purpose alone renders
the governmental action unconstitutional.4 0 Thus, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 41
a "moment of silence" law that was found to have been adopted for the
purpose of encouraging school prayer was unconstitutional, even though
a "moment of silence" law, not found to have been adopted for this
purpose, would be constitutionally permissible.42
In the earlier article, I said that it would be a rare case in which the
"religious purpose" principle would control the outcome of an
Establishment Clause challenge. This would be because whenever a
governmental action has been undertaken for a religious purpose, it
would usually also have the effect of advancing religion and so would be
unconstitutional under the second Lemon principle. I went on to say that
insofar as the "religious purpose" principle had surfaced in cases other
than Wallace v. Jaffree, it had been primarily to counter the state's
contention that the challenged governmental action had a religiously
neutral effect.4 3 From the standpoint of the litigating lawyer mounting an
beliefs and the degree to which this action might harm religious or irreligious
minorities. Lemon does not provide a categorical, bright-line rule. Through its
applications of Lemon, of course, the Supreme Court creates precedents that
control the resolution of particular questions, thereby giving context-specific
guidance to lower courts and to other governmental officials. But Lemon itself
provides no more than a general standard, or "helpful signpost," for evaluating
Establishment Clause challenges.
Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 870 (1993).
40. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1981).
4 1. Id.
42. See Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking
the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 909 (1987). Professor Simson noted that
this principle is defensible insofar as "it recognizes that a law adopted for reasons
incompatible with the Establishment Clause should be struck down even though the law
would be unassailable if adopted for valid reasons." See also Ira C. Lupu, Which Old
Witch?: A Comment on Professor Paulsen's Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
883, 886 (1993). Professor Lupu said that the principle "is nothing more than a
particularization of the general obligation that legislation be designed to pursue
constitutionally permissible ends." Id.
43. Thus, in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the historical context of the
enactment of the Arkansas anti-evolution law belied the contention that the law had the
effect of advancing religiously neutral educational objectives. The Court noted, "It is
clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason for existence."
Id. at 107-08. Likewise, in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam), the
state tried to justify the required posting of the Ten Commandments in public school
classrooms on the ground that the Ten Commandments were the basis of the legal code of
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Establishment Clause challenge, there would be no utility in undertaking
the burdensome task of proving "religious purpose" when the challenge
will succeed by making a showing of "religious effect." I concluded that,
in practice, the first "Lemon principle would be invoked only in a rare
case such as Wallace v. Jaffree, where the challenged governmental
action, divorced from its 'religious purpose,' would not have the
constitutionally impermissible effect of 'advancing religion."'4
However, the first Lemon principle was given some vitality by the
Supreme Court's 2005 decision in McCreary County, Kentucky v.
A CL U. 45 The Court majority invoked the principle to hold
unconstitutional the inclusion of the Ten Commandments in a
"Foundations of American Law and Government" exhibit at a Kentucky
county courthouse that was designed to show that the Commandments
were a part of Kentucky's "precedent legal code." 46 The Court had
previously held that a governmental display of the Ten Commandments
standing alone violated the Establishment Clause, because the Ten
Commandments constituted an "instrument of religion," so that a
governmental display of the Ten Commandments had the purpose and
effect of advancing religion.47 However, it was assumed, as the Court
held in a companion case decided the same day as McCreary,4 8 that the
inclusion of the Ten Commandments in a broader display of historical
documents would advance a secular purpose and so would not violate the
Establishment Clause. 49 Thus, if the Kentucky county's "Foundations of
American Law and Government" exhibit was to be held unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause, it could only be because the exhibit
violated the first Lemon "religious purpose" principle. As will be
discussed more fully subsequently, the Court majority found that the
western civilization and the American common law. The Court rejected this proffered
justification as pretextual. Id. In the same vein, in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
586 (1987), the clear religious purpose behind the enactment of Louisiana's law requiring
that "creation science" be taught along with evolution rendered pretextual the contention
that the law had the effect of promoting "academic freedom."
44. Sedler, supra note 1, at 1345-47.
45. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
46. Id. The Court majority consisted of Justices Souter, Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg,
and Breyer. Id. at 849. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Id. Justice Scalia,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kennedy, dissented. Id. at 849,
885.
47. Stone, 449 U.S. at 39 n.43.
48. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
49. This result would follow from the Court's decisions dealing with holiday season
displays, in which the display of a religious symbol, such as a nativity scene or a menorah
standing alone, would have the effect of advancing religion, while the inclusion of these
symbols along with secular symbols in a broader holiday season display would have the
secular effect of celebrating the holiday season and so would not violate the
Establishment Clause. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1400-03.
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display was undertaken for the purpose of advancing religion in violation
of the first Lemon prong and so was unconstitutional.o
McCreary is a case like Wallace v. Jaffree,5s in which it was
necessary to challenge the governmental action under the "religious
purpose" principle because that action could not be successfully
challenged under the "religious effect" principle. As I pointed out in the
earlier article, from the standpoint of the litigating lawyer mounting an
Establishment Clause challenge, there would be no utility in undertaking
the burdensome task of proving "religious purpose" when the challenge
would succeed by making a showing of "religious effect." This is why I
concluded that, in practice, the first Lemon principle would be invoked
only in a rare case like Wallace v. Jaffree, in which the challenged
governmental action, divorced from its "religious purpose," would not
have the constitutionally impermissible effect of "advancing religion."5 2
We can now add McCreary to the example of such cases. However,
McCreary may encourage lawyers to add a challenge under the
"religious purpose" principle to the challenge under the "religious effect"
principle. Often, when governmental officials undertake action that will
have the effect of benefitting religion, they will try to score political
points by emphasizing their religiosity and their support for religion by
taking action that will benefit religion. In cases where the ability to
demonstrate that the challenged governmental action has a religious
effect may be less certain, it may be helpful to try make a showing of a
violation of the "religious purpose" principle as well. In any event, the
decision in McCreary now supplies another precedent for invoking the
"religious purpose" principle of the Lemon test and may have given that
principle some renewed vitality.
2. The "Advancing Religion" Principle
The second Lemon principle is that governmental action with the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion is unconstitutional.
Where governmental action has this effect, the government has, whether
it intended to do so or not, violated the overriding principle that the
Establishment Clause commands complete official neutrality toward
religion. The "advancing or inhibiting religion" principle represents the
Court's value judgment in favor of an expansive interpretation of the
50. See infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
51. 472 U.S. 38 (1981).
52. Sedler, supra note 1, at 1345-46.
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Establishment Clause and, to this extent, may be seen as promoting a
"separationist" agenda.53
Under the "advancing or inhibiting religion" principle, any
governmental involvement with religion is readily subject to
constitutional challenge on the ground that it has a constitutionally
impermissible "religious" effect. The government's demonstration of a
secular purpose for its action, which is not at all difficult for the
government to satisfy in most cases, thus becomes completely irrelevant.
Stated simply, by adopting an "effects" test for Establishment Clause
challenges, the Court has come down strongly on the side of
"separation," and this is reflected in the large number of decisions
invalidating governmental involvements with religion under the
Establishment Clause.
However, the "advancing or inhibiting religion" principle, standing
alone, is very difficult to apply in a dispositive way to resolve most
Establishment Clause issues. Most governmental involvements with
religion have the effect of "advancing or inhibiting religion" to some
degree. Some involvements, such as school prayer or bible reading,
appear not to have any other significant effect and so are
unconstitutional. 5 However, many governmental involvements with
religion also advance some secular objective as well and thus will have a
''secular effect" in addition to the "religious effect." The classic example
of a "dual effect" is governmental financial aid to parochial schools.
Such aid has the effect of "advancing religion" because it supports the
religious side of parochial school education. However, it also has the
secular effect of "advancing education," as it supports the secular side of
parochial school education as well and relieves the public schools from
53. In a number of contexts, the matter of a "purpose" test versus an "effects" test is
of crucial importance in determining the scope of a particular constitutional provision.
For example, the Court has used an "effects" test to determine the constitutionality of
state regulation and taxation of interstate commerce. By holding that the negative aspect
of the Commerce Clause invalidates state regulatory and tax laws that have a
"discriminatory effect" on interstate commerce, without regard to a showing of
"discriminatory purpose," the Court has made negative Commerce Clause challenges
fairly easy to sustain and, in so doing, has gone a long way in preventing any form of
"state protectionism." See generally Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as
a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional
Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 895-912 (1985). On the other hand, the Court has held
that laws that advance a racially neutral purpose are not subject to constitutional
challenge on the ground that they have a "racially discriminatory" effect. Robert A.
Sedler, The Constitution and the Consequences of the Social History of Racism, 40 ARK.
L. REV. 677, 687-96 (1987). By so holding, the Court has severely limited the
circumstances in which racial minorities can mount a successful constitutional challenge
to laws and governmental actions that have the foreseeable effect of disadvantaging racial
minorities. See id. at 687-96; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
54. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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the obligation of educating parochial school children. In this situation, it
is not possible to say which effect is "primary." Government financial
aid to the parochial schools advances both effects in equal measure. The
question then becomes whether such aid is unconstitutional, and the
Court has held that direct aid to parochial schools, as opposed to aid to
students attending parochial schools and their parents, is
unconstitutional.s
Because this is so, in applying the "advancing or inhibiting religion"
principle, the Court necessarily had to develop subsidiary doctrines that
assist in determining whether a particular governmental involvement has
the effect of "advancing or inhibiting religion." The Court's precedents
in the different areas of Establishment Clause litigation also influence the
Court's determination of this question. While the Court expressly applies
the "advancing or inhibiting religion" principle in many Establishment
Clause cases, in only a limited number of cases will the principle itself be
a useful analytical tool in enabling the Court to resolve the particular
Establishment Clause issue before it. The result in most of the
"advancing or inhibiting religion" cases then will depend on the Court's
application of subsidiary doctrines and relevant precedents to determine
whether the particular governmental action has the primary effect of
"advancing or inhibiting religion."
3. The "Excessive Entanglement" Principle
Under this principle, governmental action that fosters "excessive
entanglement" with religion violates the Establishment Clause. The
''excessive entanglement" principle originated in older cases involving
controversies between church officials and disputes over church
property. In those cases, the Court held that the Establishment Clause
precluded the civil courts from becoming involved with matters of
religious doctrine or policy and that the courts must defer to the
resolution of those issues by the highest tribunal of a hierarchical church
authority. 6 The "excessive entanglement" principle in its current form
was articulated and applied by the Court in Lemon to hold
unconstitutional a state program supplementing the salaries of parochial
school teachers of secular subjects. " To ensure that the teachers
receiving the supplements taught only secular subjects, the state imposed
restrictions on the teachers and required the submission of financial data
55. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929);
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
57. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
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and the examination of school records. 5 The continuing state
surveillance of the parochial schools under the program was held to
violate the Establishment Clause because it would result in an "excessive
and enduring entanglement between state and church."59
The result in Lemon reflects an interaction between the "advancing
or inhibiting religion" principle and the "excessive entanglement"
principle. The salary supplement program invalidated on "excessive
entanglement" grounds in Lemon included the monitoring features in an
effort to avoid the invalidation of the program under the "advancing or
inhibiting religion" principle. Supplementing the salaries of parochial
school teachers of secular subjects obviously would have the effect of
"advancing religion" unless the state could ensure that these teachers
would not include any religious teaching in their classes. However, the
monitoring provisions by their very nature rendered the program
violative of the "excessive entanglement principle," and so the program
was unconstitutional.o
In more recent years, religious organizations have invoked the
"excessive entanglement" principle, along with the Free Exercise
Clause, to obtain a constitutionally-required exemption from
governmental regulation that is claimed to interfere improperly
58. See id. at 619-21.
59. Id. at 619.
60. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970), decided one year prior to
Lemon, the Court appeared to apply the "excessive entanglement" principle "in reverse,"
so to speak, to uphold against Establishment Clause challenge the inclusion of property
used for religious purposes in a general property tax exemption for non-profit institutions.
The Court noted that the inclusion of property used for religious purposes in the general
tax exemption promoted "benevolent neutrality" toward religion and avoided the
"entanglement" problems that could result from governmental valuation of church
property for tax purposes and enforcement of the tax against church property. See id. at
669. In retrospect, however, it is clear that the basis of the Court's holding in Walz was
"benevolent neutrality" rather than "non-entanglement." As will be discussed
subsequently, the result in Walz was based on the Court's application of the subsidiary
doctrine of the non-discriminatory inclusion of religion. Id. at 690. Under this doctrine,
the government may, in at least some circumstances, include the religious with the
secular in the receipt of governmental benefits; in Walz, the Court held that this applied to
property tax exemptions for non-profit institutions. Id. at 681. The "entanglement" that
was avoided by exempting church property from the tax would not justify an exemption
for church property alone, and this would be unconstitutional as a preference for religion
over non-religion. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding an
exemption from the state sales tax law for religious periodicals alone violative of the
Establishment Clause). In other words, the property tax exemption in Walz did not violate
the Establishment Clause because it was included in a property tax exemption for all non-
profit institutions. The avoidance of "entanglement" problems by the exemption, in
retrospect, was not necessary to the decision and would not justify an exemption for
church property alone. See also infra notes 201- 11 and accompanying text.
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with their religious operations. In this circumstance, the
application of the "excessive entanglement" principle seems to
focus more on the extent of governmental oversight of religious
matters, while the Free Exercise claim seems to focus more on
the extent to which the particular regulation interferes with the
ability of the religious organization to carry out its religious
purpose. In resolving the constitutional question in the particular
case, the Court is likely to [consider] both elements .. . and to
base its decision on both clauses.
C. Subsidiary Doctrines
A number of subsidiary doctrines have emerged from the Court's
Establishment Clause decisions over the years. Some of these
doctrines, such as "endorsement/symbolic union," have been
articulated and expressly applied by the Court. Others, such as
"accommodation for religious freedom," represent my
explanation of results that the Court has reached in a number of
Establishment Clause cases. However derived or explained,
these doctrines, which sometimes overlap or interact, are in fact
applied by the Court in actual cases, and so comprise an element
of the "law of the Establishment Clause." As stated previously,
in practice the Court uses these subsidiary doctrines to determine
whether or not a particular governmental involvement with
religion amounts to "advancing or inhibiting religion," and if so,
invalidates the action under that principle.62
The Court's Establishment Clause decisions in the sixteen years
since the publication of the earlier article involved these subsidiary
doctrines along with the precedents discussed in the next section.
1. Primary Effect and Incidental Benefit
When the primary effect of a governmental action is to advance a
secular purpose, that action does not violate the Establishment Clause
merely because it provides an "incidental benefit" to religion. This
subsidiary doctrine relates directly to defining the meaning of the
"advancing or inhibiting religion" principle. The crucial question in each
case is whether the governmental action effectively advances a secular
61. Sedler, supra note 1, at 1350-51. This is what the Court did in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); see also supra
note 19.
62. Sedler, supra note 1, at 1351.
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purpose and provides no more than an "incidental benefit" to religion.
Obviously, whether the governmental action provides no more than an
"incidental benefit" to religion is a matter of degree, and the Court must
weigh the government's interest in advancing the secular purpose by the
means chosen against the resulting "benefit" to religion.
The Court articulated this subsidiary doctrine and applied it in the
pre-Lemon case of McGowan v. Maryland,3 in which it upheld the
constitutionality of a then current and now long obsolete state "Sunday
closing" law requiring most businesses to close on Sunday. The Court
justified the law on the ground that regardless of its historic religiously-
based origin, it now provided for a uniform day of rest and, therefore,
had a secular purpose within the meaning of the first Lemon principle.6
Because the law effectively advanced that secular purpose-the great
majority of employees would have Sunday off from work-the Court
concluded that the law did not have the effect of "advancing religion,"
notwithstanding that the choice of that day coincided with the Christian
Sabbath and therefore provided an "incidental benefit" to religion.65 The
"primary effect and incidental benefit" doctrine also explains why it is
constitutionally permissible for the government to include religious
institutions as recipients of governmental funding to provide secular
services. Providing funding to these organizations effectively advances
the secular purpose for which the funding is provided, and, consequently,
any "incidental benefit" for the religious mission of these organizations
from the funding is deemed tolerable.66 Finally, this doctrine explains, at
least in retrospect, why it is constitutionally permissible for the state to
provide certain benefits, such as bus transportation and secular
textbooks, to parochial school students. The provision of bus
transportation, for example, advances the secular purpose of getting
children to school safely, and because this is so, the Establishment
Clause has been held to tolerate this "incidental benefit" to the parochial
schools.67 Again, the point to be emphasized is that the determination of
the constitutional question depends on whether the effect of the law is
primarily secular. If it is, the law is constitutional notwithstanding that it
may provide an incidental benefit to religion.
63. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
64. Id. at 450.
65 Id.
66. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
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2. Secular Deism
Proponents of a narrow or "accommodationist" interpretation of the
Establishment Clause sometimes draw an analogy to the references to
God in governmental ceremonies and activities, such as the reference to
"One Nation Under God" in the official Pledge of Allegiance; the
national motto of "In God We Trust" placed on American currency,
official documents, and public buildings; and the traditional opening of
federal court sessions with "God Save the United States and this
Honorable Court." They also cite the fact that historically religious
holidays such as Thanksgiving and Christmas are celebrated today as
national holidays. Therefore, they argue by analogy that because these
practices assumedly do not violate the Establishment Clause, other
governmental involvements with religion, such as a display of a nativity
scene on public property, do not violate the Establishment Clause
either. 68
"The definitive answer to this argument by analogy lies in the
doctrine of secular deism. These official references to God and related
practices do not violate the Establishment Clause because, through long
usage in a secular context, they have lost their religious significance." 69
Because they have lost their religious significance, they do not have the
effect of advancing religion and, therefore, do not violate the second
Lemon principle. As Justice Douglas noted many years ago, "We are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 70
Precisely because this has been so, it should not be surprising that these
practices have become a part of official life. For this reason, they are
now deemed to have a secular meaning and are therefore constitutionally
unobjectionable. Furthermore, whatever religious significance
Thanksgiving and Christmas may retain, it cannot seriously be
questioned that they are celebrated by large segments of the public as
68. Chief Justice Burger appeared to be advancing this argument to some extent in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). However, it was not the basis of the Court's
decision in that case or in subsequent cases applying Lynch to uphold the constitutionality
of religious symbols in primarily secular displays. See infra notes 223-29 and
accompanying text.
69. Sedler, supra note 1, at 1353. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan has referred to these practices
as having been "interwoven ... so deeply into the fabric of our civil polity that [their]
present use may well not present that type of involvement which the First Amendment
prohibits." Id. at 303; see also Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
492 U.S. 573, 632-33 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referencing Justice Blackmun's
discussion of this point); CHOPER, supra note 5, at 108-12 (discussing the "American
Civil Religion," referring to "secular political statements that fall within the category of
'widely shared and basically noncontroversial public values"').
70. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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secular holidays. Thanksgiving is about family reunions, turkey dinners,
and football. Christmas is the national holiday of gift giving. The
doctrine of secular deism means, then, that these official references to
God and the celebration of secular holidays that have a religious origin
do not violate the Establishment Clause. 71 It also means that the
argument by analogy to support a narrow or "accommodationist"
interpretation of the Establishment Clause is structurally unsound.
3. Endorsement/Symbolic Union
Under this subsidiary doctrine, governmental action violates the
Establishment Clause when it would be perceived by an objective
observer as constituting a governmental endorsement of religion or as
creating a symbolic union between government and religion. When
governmental action would be perceived in this manner, it has the effect
of advancing religion and therefore violates the second Lemon principle.
The endorsement/symbolic union doctrine provides a doctrinal
explanation of why the display of an unadorned nativity scene on public
71. The view expressed in the earlier article that the reference to "One Nation Under
God" in the official Pledge of Allegiance is an example of secular deism, and the holding
of the Seventh Circuit in Sherman that this reference to God in the Pledge did not
constitute an impermissible religious prayer was challenged by the holding of the Ninth
Circuit in Newdow v. Elk Grove School District, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 542
U.S. 1 (2004), to the effect that the recitation of the Pledge with this reference to God by
a public school teacher leading the prayer constituted an impermissible establishment of
religion by the school district. The Supreme Court avoided dealing with the constitutional
question by holding that the non-custodial parent who brought the suit lacked standing
when the custodial parent did not object to this recitation. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16-17
(2004). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas disagreed with the
standing holding and took the position that the reference to God in the Pledge did not
constitute an impermissible establishment of religion. Id. at 18 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor's concurrence invoked what I have referred to as secular
deism. See id. at 36-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She stated as follows:
There are no de minimis violations of the Constitution-no constitutional
[violations] so slight that the courts are obliged to ignore them. Given the
values that the Establishment Clause was meant to serve, however, I believe
that the government can, in a discrete category of cases, acknowledge or refer
to the divine without offending the Constitution. This category of "ceremonial
deism" most clearly encompasses such things as the national motto ("In God
We Trust"), religious references in patriotic songs such as The Star-Spangled
Banner, and the words with which the Marshal of this Court opens each of its
sessions ("God save the United States and this honorable Court"). These
references are not minor trespasses upon the Establishment Clause to which I
turn a blind eye. Instead, their history, character, and context prevent them from
being constitutional violations at all.
Id. at 36-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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property is unconstitutional,7 2 while the inclusion of a nativity scene as a
part of a larger holiday season display is not.73 The Court found that the
former display constituted an endorsement of Christianity while the latter
did not.74 While this distinction may appear somewhat questionable, it
clearly illustrates the operation of the endorsement/symbolic union
doctrine in practice. The Court has also applied this doctrine to hold
unconstitutional a grant to churches of a veto over the issuance of a
liquor license in proximity to a church.75
4. Accommodation for Religious Freedom, But Not for Religion
An essential tenet of the "accommodationist" position is that the
Establishment Clause should permit some accommodation for religion in
public life.76 Despite expressions of this view by some Justices in various
72. See Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. 573.
73. See Lynch, 465 U.S. 668.
74. See Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 574; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
75. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). In School District of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985),
the Court concluded that the presence of public school employees in a parochial school
classroom amounted to a symbolic union between government and religion. On this basis,
it held unconstitutional the use of public school employees to teach secular subjects or to
provide remedial services to parochial school students in parochial school classrooms. In
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997), the Court took the position that the
presence of public school employees in a parochial school classroom, without more, does
not "create the impression of a 'symbolic union' between church and state" and overruled
the holdings in Ball and Aguilar.
76. This tenet was expressed forcefully by Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid
O'Scanniain, reluctantly concurring in Separation of Church & State Committee. v. City
of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996), in which the Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional a
city's display of a large Latin cross.
[T]he Supreme Court in the last half-century has constructed and zealously
policed a "wall of separation" between church and state that was unknown and,
indeed, unthinkable at the time of the framing....
Further, the practices that were prevalent and accepted during the early
history of this Nation lead to the conclusion that, even as to the national
government, the Establishment Clause was not intended to erect a 'wall of
separation' between church and state. Rather, the accommodation of religion
was not only permitted but encouraged. For instance, our national government
has, throughout its history, manifested an abiding belief in the value of prayer.
Id. at 620-22.
Professor Michael W. McConnell has carefully distinguished this view of
"accommodation" from an "accommodation for religious freedom," which he strongly
advocates.
I must stress at the outset that this Article's conception of accommodation does
not include government action that acknowledges or expresses the prevailing
religious sentiments of the community such as the display of a religious symbol
on public property or the delivery of a prayer at public ceremonial events. Such
610 [Vol. 59:589
2013] UNDERSTANDING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
contexts,77 the Court has not upheld government action favoring religion
on the ground that it reflected a permissible "accommodation" for
religion. Thus, in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., the Court held
unconstitutional a law that entitled an employee to take off work on the
day that the employee observed as the Sabbath. The effect of the law was
to advance religion because the only employees who could choose a day
off were employees who wanted to observe a day as their Sabbath.7 9 For
the Court to have held that it was constitutionally permissible for the
government to make an "accommodation" for religion would be
inconsistent with the overriding Establishment Clause principle of
complete official neutrality toward religion, since the effect of such an
"accommodation" would be to prefer religion over non-religion.
The overriding principle of complete official neutrality toward
religion, however, has not been seen by the Court as precluding the
government from taking action in some circumstances to protect the
religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions. It is here that
the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause takes account of
the Free Exercise Clause and the common purpose of both clauses to
secure religious freedom. The doctrine that has emerged from the Court's
decisions in this area is that the government may take action that is
precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and
religious institutions. It is for this reason that the Establishment Clause is
not violated by Title VII's religious employee exemption for religious
institutions,80 or its requirement that an employer make a reasonable
accommodation for an employee's religious beliefs. 81 Likewise, an
exemption from military service limited to those whose opposition to war
is based on religious or moral beliefs, as opposed to political beliefs, has
been assumed to be consistent with the Establishment Clause. 82 The same
is true of an exemption for sacramental wine during Prohibition and for
the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies of the Native-American
church.8 3 Finally, in the more recent case of Cutter v. Wilkinson,84 the
acknowledgments do not leave the decision about religious practice to the
individual or group, but rather serve as a social or collective expression of
religious ideas.
McConnell, supra note 5, at 687.
77. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673-78 (Burger, C.J.).
78. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
79. Id. at 709-11.
80. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
81. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); see also infra
notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
82. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1432-33 n.418.
83. See infra notes 364-68 and accompanying text.
84. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
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Court held that the Establishment Clause was not violated by the
application of a provision of federal law that was interpreted as requiring
prison officials to take action to accommodate inmates' religious
practices.
5. The Non-Discriminatory Inclusion of Religion
Because the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is one
of complete official neutrality toward religion, the Establishment Clause
does not require that the government be hostile to religion. As discussed
earlier, this means that the government can include religious institutions
in the services it provides to the public generally, such as police and fire
protection; it can include religious institutions that provide secular
services as recipients of governmental funding; and it can provide
religious organizations with equal access to governmental facilities."
The Court, however, has gone further and has held that, at least in some
circumstances, the government does not violate the Establishment Clause
when it includes the religious with the secular in the receipt of
governmental benefits. Under this doctrine, the Court has held that the
Establishment Clause is not violated by tax exemptions for religious,
charitable, and educational organizations8 6 or by allowing parents to take
tax deductions for educational expenses, notwithstanding that most of
these deductions are taken for tuition payments made by parents who are
sending their children to parochial schools. 8 7 The non-discriminatory
inclusion of religion doctrine was also the basis for the Court's holding
that it was constitutionally permissible for a blind student to use state
payments provided to such students for educational purposes to attend a
religiously-affiliated college for the purpose of pursuing a religious
vocation.88 Finally, this doctrine was the basis for two of the Court's
most important Establishment Clause decisions in the post-1997 period.
The Court upheld against Establishment Clause challenge a program in
which parochial school students were included with public school
students in the loan of computers and other instructional materials 8 9 and a
program in which vouchers for tuition at parochial schools were included
with other financial assistance for the parents of children attending
underperforming public schools.90
85. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
86. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
87. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
88. Winters v. Wash. Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
89. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
90. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). See Eugene Volokh, Equal
Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 341, 365-73
(1999), for an argument to the effect that not only may the government include parochial
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While it may be possible to identify other subsidiary doctrines from
the Court's Establishment Clause decisions, these subsidiary doctrines
are most frequently applied in practice. As stated above, in practice,
these subsidiary doctrines relate primarily to determining whether or not
a particular governmental involvement with religion amounts to
"advancing or inhibiting religion" and so would be invalid under the
second Lemon principle.
D. The Precedents9'
In actual Establishment Clause litigation, lawyers and judges are not
likely to approach the Establishment Clause as an undifferentiated whole.
Rather, they are likely to approach it in terms of different areas of
Establishment Clause law and to focus on the applicable precedents in
each of the different areas. The precedents are more important than the
operational principles and subsidiary doctrines, discussed previously,
because they are more directly relevant to the analysis of the particular
governmental action that is at issue. The Court's precedents have been
the primary factor in the development of each of the different areas of
Establishment Clause law. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident
than in the area of aid to parochial schools. Aid to parochial schools first
came before the Court in Everson v. Board of Education,92 which is also
the seminal case in the development of the Court's modem
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. At issue in that case was the
constitutionality of New Jersey's policy that reimbursed parochial
schools for the cost of student bus transportation. A sharply divided
Court held, 5-4, that the state's provision of bus transportation for
parochial school students did not violate the Establishment Clause. 93
In setting forth the "classic meaning" of the Establishment Clause in
Everson, Justice Black stated, "No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
schools in aid programs, but if it chooses to include private schools in a governmental aid
program, it may not constitutionally exclude religious schools.
However, thirty-nine states have state constitutional "no aid" provisions that
preclude the use of state funds for the support of sectarian or denominational schools, and
these and related provisions have been interpreted by state courts as prohibiting voucher
programs that include vouchers for attendance at parochial schools. See infra notes 192-
99 and accompanying text.
91. In our discussion of the precedents, we will be including some cases that have
discussed "The Operational Principles" and "Subsidiary Doctrines." The author has
concluded that this "repeat discussion" is necessary to maintain continuity and
completeness.
92. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
93. See id. at 18.
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religion." 94 However, the Court had held many years before Everson that
the Establishment Clause was not violated by a governmental grant of
funds to a religiously-affiliated institution, such as a hospital, in order to
enable it to provide secular services.9 5 It is obvious that in a parochial
school, there is a complete admixture of the secular and the religious.
Parochial schools provide children with instruction in the secular
subjects, but they do so from a completely religious perspective, which is
why those parents who choose to send their children to parochial schools
do so.
To the dissenting Justices in Everson, the admixture of the secular
with the religious in parochial schools precluded any form of
governmental aid to parochial schools because such aid would inevitably
advance the schools' religious function.96 The majority did not dispute
this point but avoided its implications by drawing a distinction between
aid to the school, which was constitutionally impermissible, and aid to
the child, which the majority said was permissible. Because the provision
of bus transportation to the parochial school was considered aid to the
child and advanced the state's important interest in securing the child's
safety, the majority concluded that transportation assistance did not
violate the Establishment Clause.97
Constitutional law, as previously noted, develops in a line of growth.
Under the Everson precedent, it is constitutionally permissible for the
state to provide aid to the child, notwithstanding that its provision of
such aid would also result in some "incidental" benefit to the parochial
school. Taking their cue from Everson, in the years following, some
states tried to assist parochial schools in meeting the increasing expenses
of educating their students by providing benefits in the form of "aid to
the child." Applying the Everson precedent, the Court held that a state
could loan parochial school students the same textbooks for secular
subjects that it loaned to public school students.98 The Court also held
that states could provide diagnostic services through which state
employees tested individual children for particular health and educational
problems in the parochial schools.99 In more recent years, the Court has
expanded the concept of "aid to the child," upholding, for example, a
program that lent computers and other instructional materials to
parochial school students as well as to public school students. 00 The
94. Id. at 16.
95. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
96. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 49-53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 16-18.
98. See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
99. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1977).
100. See infra notes 143-159 and accompanying text.
614 [Vol. 59:589
2013] UNDERSTANDING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Court has also made it possible for the state to aid parochial schools by
characterizing some forms of government assistance to parochial
schools-such as the inclusion of parochial school vouchers in an
assistance program for low-income parents of children attending
parochial schools-as a form of parental choice that did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 1'
What the Everson precedent does is to preclude the state from
providing any form of direct aid to the parochial schools themselves,
such as subsidizing the salaries of parochial school teachers or giving
grants for the construction of buildings at parochial schools, because this
form of aid would advance the religious purpose of the schools. 102 Thus,
whenever a state undertook to provide some form of assistance to
parochial schools, the analysis of the constitutional issue depended on
whether the court characterized the particular form of assistance as "aid
to the child" or "aid to the school." Although the Court had held that the
loan of textbooks was constitutionally permissible "aid to the child," the
Court had also held that the loan of instructional materials, such as
recording equipment, laboratory equipment, and maps, fell on the side of
"aid to the school" and thus was constitutionally impermissible.'s The
Court has since departed from that holding and, in an effort to bring
computers in line with textbooks, has held that the state can loan
computers and other instructional materials to parochial school students
so long as the program establishes adequate standards to prevent
computers and instructional materials from being diverted for religious
purposes.'04 What this means, in light of the Everson precedent, is that
with adequate standards to prevent divertibility, any program of
instructional aid falls on the side of "aid to the child" and so is
constitutionally permissible. The Everson precedent remains viable, and
its effect is to allow state assistance for parochial school education only
when the particular form of assistance is held to fall on the side of "aid to
101. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); see also infra notes 167-74
and accompanying text.
102. In Lemon itself, an effort to avoid this part of the Everson precedent, by state
supplementation of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in parochial schools,
foundered on the "excessive entanglement" principle. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
620-22, 624-25 (1971). The supplementation was constitutionally impermissible because
the program also provided for state monitoring of the teaching of secular subjects in order
to ensure that the teaching was free of religious content. Id. But even if the program had
not provided for state monitoring, it would have been unconstitutional under the second
religious effect Lemon prong, because it took the form of a direct financial subsidy to the
parochial school, enabling it to carry out its religious purpose more effectively.
103. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 248-51.
104. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
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the child" rather than "aid to the school."os The Everson precedent and
its impact on determining the constitutionality of aid to parochial
education illustrates the importance of precedent in the structure of the
"law of the Establishment Clause."' 0
I see Establishment Clause litigation, and thus the Court's
Establishment Clause precedents, as falling into five general areas: (1)
religious practices in the public schools; (2) financial aid and
governmental benefits to religion; (3) governmental action purportedly
"advancing religion"; (4) entanglement and governmental interference in
religious matters; and (5) preference for religion or between religions,
which includes actions designed to protect the religious freedom of
individuals and religious institutions. The discussion of the application of
the "law of the Establishment Clause" in the next part of this Article will
be organized into these five areas.
105. In practice, especially in more recent years, the Court has managed to uphold the
particular form of aid as constitutionally permissible "aid to the child" or constitutionally
permissible "parental choice." See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text. In
Zobrest v. Catalina School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993), a sharply divided Court held, 5-4,
that when a school district provided sign language interpreters for hearing impaired
students in the public schools, the Establishment Clause did not preclude it from
providing a sign language interpreter for a hearing impaired student who transferred to a
parochial school. And in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 503 (1997), the Court, again
sharply divided, held, 5-4, that remedial instructional programs for low-income students
could be provided to parochial school students in parochial school classrooms and that
public teachers could teach secular "enrichment courses" in the parochial schools. These
cases coupled the two post-1997 aid to parochial education cases. See Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000); Zelman, 536 U.S. 639. These cases indicate that the Court is
disposed to uphold most forms of aid to parochial education by bringing them within the
ambit of "aid to the child" or the ambit of "parental choice." See infra notes 144-200 and
accompanying text.
106. In the original article, I suggested that the Court could have resolved the
constitutional issue in Everson differently. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1362-64. Because
there is a complete admixture of the secular and the religious in parochial schools, the
Court could have held that under its precedents permitting the government to grant funds
to a religiously affiliated institution in order to enable it to provide secular services, the
state could give aid to parochial schools by a reasonable apportionment formula. Id. This
would result in the state receiving approximately half of the amount of funds for the same
activity as the state provided for public schools. Id. Under this precedent, the bus
transportation program in Everson would violate the Establishment Clause because it was
not apportioned. See id. However, the state could generally provide a great deal of aid to
parochial schools under a reasonable apportionment formula. See id. But this was not the
holding of Everson, which was based on the constitutional permissibility of "aid to the
child." Id.
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III. THE APPLICATION OF THE "LAW OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE"
This part of the Article repeats in highly summarized form much of
the comparable part of the original article. I said in the original article
that that part of the article would read somewhat like a "restatement," in
which I discussed the results that the Supreme Court had reached in its
application of the "law of the Establishment Clause" in the five major
areas of Establishment Clause litigation. I said that I hoped to
demonstrate that most of the major questions arising under the
Establishment Clause had by then been settled and that much of
Establishment Clause litigation in the future would involve issues that
generally could be resolved by the application of the relevant Supreme
Court principles, doctrines, and precedents.'07
In the present article, I will incorporate the seven Supreme Court
Establishment Clause cases decided by the Court since 1997 into the
discussion of the application of the "law of the Establishment Clause."
While some of these cases may have had important political
implications, such as the decision on the constitutional permissibility of
including parochial school vouchers in a program to help children
attending failing inner city schools, 0 8 the cases generally involved the
application of the "law of the Establishment Clause" to particular factual
situations. The cases did not break new ground, and the "law of the
Establishment Clause" has not changed significantly from what it was at
the time of the original article. We now turn to the five major areas of
Establishment Clause litigation.
A. Religious Practices in the Public Schools
By the time of the original article, the Supreme Court had declared
unconstitutional all state-sponsored religious practices in the public
schools, such as school-sponsored prayer (both in the classroom and at
commencement), 109 Bible reading, "o and posting a copy of the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms. "' The Court had also
declared unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the teaching of
evolution in the public schoolsi' 2 and a state law requiring the teaching
107. Sedler, supra note 1, at 1364-65.
108. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639.
109. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992). In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), the Court found that a state law
"mandating a moment of silence" was adopted for the purpose of encouraging school
prayer and thus held that it was unconstitutional as violating the first Lemon prong.
I10. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
111. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
112. See Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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of "creation science" in addition to evolution, based on a factual finding
that "creation science" was not science but religion masquerading as
science. 113 The most recent attempt to undermine the teaching of
evolution in some school districts has been to counter evolution with
"intelligent design," which is purportedly an alternative "scientific"
explanation of the origin of human life. In the one "intelligent design"
case coming before a federal court, the court held an extensive
evidentiary hearing and made comprehensive findings to the effect that,
like "creation science," "intelligent design" was not science but religion
masquerading as science so that the teaching of "intelligent design" in
the public schools violated the Establishment Clause. The decision
appears to have brought to an end the effort to counter evolution with
"intelligent design. 14
In the intervening years, the Supreme Court decided one case dealing
with religious practices in the public schools. In Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe,'15 the Court held that a public school's policy,
which allowed students to choose whether a "statement or invocation"
would be a part of pre-game ceremonies of home varsity football games
113. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
114. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
The effect of the district court's decision was to ban the teaching of "intelligent design"
as effectively as if the Supreme Court had rendered the decision. The findings were not
only comprehensive but so strongly supported by expert scientific testimony as to be
unassailable. Any school district motivated to try to put "intelligent design" into the
curriculum would be advised by the school board attorney that the district would be sued
in federal court and the federal judge, relying on the findings in the Dover case, would
hold the practice to be violative of the Establishment Clause.
In Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education v. Freiler, 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000), a school board adopted a resolution that
required the teaching of evolution in the schools to be accompanied by a disclaimer to the
effect that "'the lesson to be presented, regarding the origin of life and matter, is known
as the Scientific Theory of Evolution and should be presented to inform students of the
Scientific Theory of Evolution and should be presented to inform students of the
scientific concept and not intended to influence or dissuade the Biblical version of
Creation or any other concept."' Id. at 341. It went on to state that "[s]tudents are urged
to exercise critical thinking and gather all information possible and closely examine each
alternative toward forming an opinion." Id The Fifth Circuit found that the disclaimer
violated the second Lemon principle because its primary effect was to "maintain a
particular religious viewpoint, namely belief in the Biblical version of creation." Id at
346-48. The Supreme Court denied certiorari over the dissent of Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, who maintained that the disclaimer was
sufficiently neutral and had the secular effect of advancing freedom of thought. Freiler,
530 U.S. at 1251 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
115. 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating the opinion of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, who dissented on the ground
that the Court should not have declared the policy unconstitutional on its face before it
had been put into practice).
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and, if so, to elect a student from student volunteers to deliver the
statement or invocation," constituted school sponsorship of a religious
message and so violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that
the policy would appear to an objective observer as school endorsement
of student prayer and "has the purpose and creates the perception of
encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important school
events."'1 6 The decision there continues the line of cases, holding that all
state-sponsored religious practices in the public schools, including
prayers at commencement and at athletic events, violate the
Establishment Clause.' 17
B. Financial Aid and Benefits to Religion
The cases in this area involve the question of whether the
government may, consistent with the Establishment Clause, provide
financial aid or other benefits of a financial nature to religious
institutions or to individuals who use them for a religious purpose. In
Everson, Justice Black stated a core meaning of the Establishment
Clause: "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.""'8 Professor
Jesse Choper has observed, "There is broad consensus that a central
threat to the religious freedom of individuals and groups-indeed, in the
judgment of many, 'the most serious infringement upon religious
liberty'-is posed by 'forcing them to pay taxes in support of a religious
establishment or religious activities.""' 9 Nevertheless, it is abundantly
clear that every form of financial aid or other benefits of a financial
nature provided by the government to "religion" does not violate the
Establishment Clause. In Everson itself, the Court held that the state did
not violate the Establishment Clause by providing free bus transportation
for parochial school students.' 20 Justice Douglas' observation that the
Establishment Clause "does not say that in every and all respects there
shall be a separation of Church and State . . . [but] [r]ather, it studiously
116. Id. at 317.
117. The Fifth Circuit has held that it is constitutionally permissible for a public high
school to permit nonsectarian prayer at commencement if the decision to have prayer is
made by the students themselves rather than by the school official. Jones v. Clear Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992). The Third Circuit reached a contrary
result. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'1 Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d. Cir. 1996). The
Supreme Court has not dealt with this specific question. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1369-
72.
118. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
119. CHOPER, supra note 5, at 16.
120. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
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defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert
or union or dependency one on the other," 121 is a particularly apt
description of the constitutional permissibility of governmental financial
aid or benefits to religion. Broadly speaking, the constitutional result
depends on the purpose for which the financial aid or benefit is given, the
particular form that the aid or benefit takes, and whether, in the
circumstances presented, the aid or benefit creates a preference for
religion over non-religion. And in recent years, as reflected in the
Court's last two decisions involving financial aid to religion, 122 a Court
majority managed to uphold the particular form of financial aid that was
at issue in those cases. The trend is toward upholding forms of financial
aid that are provided equally to the "religious" and the "secular" so long
as the aid is used to advance a secular purpose. Looking to the Supreme
Court's precedents in this area, it is helpful to divide the cases into three
categories: (1) secular function, (2) aid to religious schools and students,
and (3) equal treatment of religion.
1. Secular Function
Most clearly, the government does not violate the Establishment
Clause when it provides financial aid to a religious institution, such as a
religiously affiliated hospital, to enable that institution to perform a
secular function. The funding has a secular purpose (the first Lemon
principle) and does not have the primary effect of advancing religion (the
second Lemon principle), and so the funding does not violate the
Establishment Clause.12 3 The Court will also assume that the religious
institution will carry out the secular function "in a lawful, secular
manner" and will not use the funding to achieve religious objectives.124
121. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
122. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 539 U.S.
639 (2002).
123. In what appears to be the first Establishment Clause case to come before the
Supreme Court, the Court saw no possible Establishment Clause objection to Congress
providing funding to a Washington, D.C., charitable hospital that was operated by a
religious order. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). The funding was provided
pursuant to a contractual arrangement by which the hospital agreed to devote two-thirds
of its patient capacity for indigent District of Columbia residents. Id. Because the hospital
essentially operated like any other hospital and performed a secular function, the
Establishment Clause was no obstacle to the federal government's contracting with the
hospital with regard to its performance of that secular function. Id.
124. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). In Bowen, the Court held that the
government could include a religiously-affiliated organization in a program of grants to
private organizations to provide counseling for the prevention of adolescent sexual
relations and care for pregnant adolescents and adolescent parents, and the Court would
not presume that the organizations would use the grants to advance their religious views
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The proposition that the government can provide funding to religiously
affiliated institutions in order to enable them to perform a secular
function has been relied on by the Supreme Court to uphold federal
assistance to church-affiliated colleges and universities. Crucial to this
holding was the Court's "constitutional finding of fact" that most church-
affiliated colleges and universities are sufficiently similar to secular
colleges and universities in their educational operation, so that providing
them with governmental funding will not have the effect of "advancing
religion." Nonetheless, the particular funding program involved in these
cases did not take the form of a general grant to the institution, but it was
targeted for specific secular purposes and was upheld on that basis.125
Where a church-affiliated college or university operates a distinctly
sectarian program, such as a divinity school, an unrestricted grant would
presumably violate the Establishment Clause because it would have the
effect of supporting, to some degree, the institution's sectarian program.
In addition, where a particular church-affiliated college or university is
found by a court to be a primarily sectarian institution, any governmental
aid to that institution, of course, violates the Establishment Clause.126
2. Aid to Religious Schools
In a religious school, commonly referred to as a parochial or
sectarian school, there is a complete admixture of the religious and the
secular. While parochial schools provide children with instruction in the
secular subjects, they designedly do so from a religious perspective. This
is precisely why parents choose to send their children to such schools.
Thus, it is not possible for the government to target funds to the parochial
on adolescent sexual relations. If opponents of the grant could make such a showing, then
the grant would have to be revoked.
125. See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (involving grants to
defray part of expense of educating students in private colleges and universities,
including grants to religiously-affiliated institutions that had given adequate assurance
that funds would be used for a secular purpose); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973)
(involving state-issued revenue bonds that could be used by church-affiliated colleges
and universities to borrow funds to finance construction of facilities used for secular
purposes); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (involving federal construction
grants to church-affiliated colleges and universities for buildings and facilities used
exclusively for secular purposes). Because these church-affiliated colleges and
universities are considered to be essentially secular institutions, there is no Establishment
Clause problem when the government provides financial assistance to students attending
such colleges. See, e.g., Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Blanton, 433
F. Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn.), aff'd mem., 434 U.S. 803 (1977).
126. Habel v. Indus. Dev. Auth., 400 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1991) (holding that Jerry
Falwell's Liberty University was a sectarian institution so that the city's issuance of
construction bonds for educational facilities at the university violated the Establishment
Clause).
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schools to be used exclusively for secular purposes, as it can do when it
is providing funds for religiously affiliated colleges and universities.
Because of the necessary admixture of the religious and secular in
parochial school education, the Court's assumption in Everson was that
any form of direct governmental aid to parochial schools would be
unconstitutional, since it would advance the religious purpose of the
schools. 127
At the same time, the Court drew a constitutionally significant
distinction between "aid to the school" and "aid to the child" and held
that the Establishment Clause is not violated when the government
funding takes the form of "aid to the child" who is attending the
parochial school.128 Once the Court drew this distinction, it was clear that
a state's provision of free bus transportation to parochial school students
in Everson fell on the side of "aid to the child" and so was
constitutionally permissible. Applying the Everson precedent, the Court
has held that a state could constitutionally provide parochial school
students with the same kinds of individual-based benefits that it provides
to public school students, such as loaning the parochial school students
the same textbooks in secular subjects that it loaned to public school
students; 129 providing diagnostic services in which state employees
would go into the parochial schools to test individual children for
particular health and educational problems;o30 providing a sign language
interpreter for a hearing-impaired student at a parochial school when it
provided a sign language interpreter for hearing-impaired students in the
public schools;' 3' and providing remedial instructional services for low-
income students in parochial school buildings.' 32
127. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1947).
128. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text. While this distinction has been
criticized by some academic commentators as focusing on the form of aid rather than on
its substance and effect, see, e.g., William P. Marshall, Toward a Nonunifying Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions: The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 243, 246-47 (1989), it has been consistently applied and never questioned by the
Court.
129. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
130. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 610, 616 (1971) (discussing the provision of school lunches to parochial school
students). Providing individualized services or school lunches or immunizations to
parochial school students in the parochial schools means only that the school is the
conduit for the distribution of a governmental benefit to the children.
131. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
132. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). The significance of Agostini in this
regard was that the Court had previously held that the remedial instructional services
could not be provided in the parochial school itself because of concerns that doing so
would create an impermissible "symbolic union" between the state and the parochial
school. As a result, these remedial instructional services were provided off-premises,
usually in mobile facilities parked on the parochial school grounds. These prior holdings
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The Court has found that the particular funding came down on the
side of "aid to the school" and thus was unconstitutional only when the
state has granted funds directly to the parochial school, such as funds for
the maintenance and repair of parochial school buildings; 133 has granted
funds in the form of an unrestricted lump-sum grant, purportedly
designed to reimburse the parochial schools for the expenses mandated
by state law;134 or, as in Lemon itself, has supplemented the salaries of
parochial school teachers in secular subjects. The decision in Lemon was
based on the excessive entanglement principle. In an effort to ensure that
the teachers receiving the supplements were not including religious with
secular instruction, the state imposed restrictions on the teachers and
required the submission of data and the examination of school records.
The program thus violated the Establishment Clause, because it would
result in an "excessive and enduring entanglement between church and
state."l 35 However, a grant to pay the salaries of the parochial school
teachers itself would necessarily fall on the side of "aid to the school"
and so have the effect of advancing religion in violation of the second
Lemon prong.
In Agostini v. Felton,' the Court expanded on the "aid to the child"
concept by upholding the constitutionality of a "shared time" program
under which public school teachers went into the parochial schools and
taught certain secular "enrichment" subjects that were designed to
were overruled in Agostini. So long as public school employees provide the remedial
instruction, they can do so in the parochial school building.
133. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
134. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1977).
135. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
136. The state was in effect caught in a "Catch 22" dilemma between the second and
third Lemon prongs. See also Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to
Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 CAL. L. REv. 5, 6 (1987). As Professor Choper
explained,
The Court began with a critical premise: the mission of church related
elementary and secondary schools is to teach religion, and all subjects either
are, or carry the potential of being, permeated with religion. Therefore, if the
government were to help fund any subjects in these schools, the effect would
aid religion unless public officials monitored the situation to see to it that those
courses were not infused with religious doctrine. But if public officials did
engage in adequate surveillance-this is the other horn of the dilemma-there
would be excessive entanglement between government and religion, the image
being government spies regularly or periodically sitting in the classes
conducted in parochial schools.
Id. at 6.
137. Agostini, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997).
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supplement the "core curriculum" of the parochial schools.138 Precisely
because the "shared time" program was supplemental to the "core
curriculum" of the parochial school, the Court concluded that it would
fall on the side of "aid to the child" rather than "aid to the parochial
school." 139 The Court specifically found that the program did not
impermissibly finance religious indoctrination by subsidizing the
primary religious mission of the school.140 Looking first to the Title I
funds for remedial instruction, the Court pointed out that by law, Title I
services were supplemental to the regular curricula and that no Title I
funds ever reached the "coffers of religious schools."1 41 Because the
remedial services provided by the program did not supplant the remedial
instruction and guidance counseling already provided by the parochial
schools, they did not "relieve sectarian schools of costs they otherwise
would have borne in educating their students" and did not "have the
effect of advancing religion by creating a financial incentive to undertake
religious indoctrination." 14 2 The same rationale would apply to the
"supplemental secular instruction" provided under the "shared time"
program.
The effect of Agostini, then, is to allow the state to provide remedial
services and "supplemental secular instruction" to parochial school
students in the parochial school buildings themselves. The Court in
Agostini was careful to maintain the fundamental Everson distinction
between constitutionally impermissible direct governmental financial aid
to the parochial schools and constitutionally permissible aid to the child.
While the Court said that governmental aid is not necessarily
unconstitutional merely because it aids the educational function of the
parochial schools, the Court also emphasized that the aid must be, in
substance, aid to the child rather than aid to the school, that the aid must
advance a clearly secular purpose that is supplemental to the religious
purpose of the school, and that the aid cannot be so substantial or of such
a nature as to create a significant financial incentive for parents to choose
a parochial school education for their children.14 3 Nonetheless, Agostini
does represent an expanded definition of "aid to the child" and, to this
extent, does permit the state to aid the educational function of parochial
schools.
138. Id. (overruling prior cases and holding that public school teachers providing
remedial and "enrichment" instruction inside the parochial school buildings themselves
did not violate the Establishment Clause).
139. Id. at 227-28.
140. Id. at 221.
141. Id. at 228.
142. Id. at 229-31.
143. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226.
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The expanded definition of "aid to the child" and the Court's
willingness to uphold the state's aid to the educational function of the
parochial schools through this vehicle came to the fore again in the 2000
case of Mitchell v. Helms. '44 In that case, the federal government
distributed funds to state and local governmental agencies that, in turn,
loaned educational materials and equipment such as library books and
computer hardware and software to elementary schools, including private
and parochial schools.145 The funds could be used only to supplement
funds from nonfederal sources, and the materials and equipment
provided to the private and parochial schools had to be "secular, neutral
and nonideological."l 4 6 A private or parochial school seeking to obtain
the funds had to submit an application to the local educational agency
detailing which items the school was seeking and how it would use those
items.147 If the local agency approved the application, it would purchase
the items from the school's application of funds and then lend them to
the school.148 The inclusion of parochial schools in the program was
challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause.149
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the program did not violate the
Establishment Clause.150 There were three opinions in the case.' 5 ' The
plurality opinion, authored by Justice Thomas and joined in by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, took the position that
the program was constitutional, because it was neutral in that it was
available to public, private, and parochial school students and was
allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favored or
disfavored religion.15 2 The thrust of the plurality opinion was that the
Establishment Clause permitted the government to give or lend to
parochial school students the same materials and equipment that it gave
or lent to public school students. 153 The plurality opinion specifically
rejected the proposition that when materials and equipment were given or
lent to parochial school students, the program had to contain
"divertibility" safeguards to ensure that the materials and equipment
would not be used for religious purposes.154
144. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
145. Id. at 803.
146. Id. at 880.
147. Id. at 882.
148. Id. at 802-03.
149. Id. at 803-04.
150. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801.
151. Id. at 800.
152. Id. at 801, 829-30.
153. Id. at 814-20.
154. Id. at 820-25.
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However, five Justices, Justices O'Connor and Breyer in a
concurring opinion'5 5 and Justices Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg in a
dissent,' 56 did require that the program contain adequate "divertibility"
standards. The difference was that the O'Connor opinion found that the
program did contain adequate "divertibility" standards, 157 while the
Souter opinion found that it did not.' 58 The result was that the Court
upheld the loan of educational materials and equipment that was at issue
in this case but rejected the view of the Thomas plurality that standards
to prevent "divertibility" were not required by the Establishment
Clause.159
It is important to note that the position of the Thomas plurality in
Mitchell v. Helms-to the effect that all that the Establishment Clause
requires is that aid be allocated on the basis of neutral secular criteria-to
a large extent reflects the results that the Court has reached in this area in
more recent years. One way or another, the Court has managed to uphold
the particular aid program at issue against Establishment Clause
challenge, and the result has been that the state has been constitutionally
permitted to assist the educational function of parochial schools.16 0
155. Id. at 836-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867-913 (Souter, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 867 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 902-10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159. The Thomas plurality and the O'Connor concurrence agreed that the decision
upholding the constitutionality of the program in this case required the overruling of the
holdings in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975), to the effect that the Establishment Clause prohibited the state from loaning
parochial school students instructional and laboratory materials and from paying for the
transportation of parochial school students on field trips to secular places. Mitchell, 530
U.S. at 835 (plurality opinion), 858-59 (concurring opinion).
160. In a law review article written after Mitchell but before Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 539 U.S. 639 (2002), Professor Michael W. McConnell explained Mitchell and
the school prayer at football games case of Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,
120 U.S. 2266 (2000), both decided during the same Term, as demonstrating that "[t]he
emerging Establishment Clause jurisprudence can be seen as a specialized application of
the state action doctrine." Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court's
Emerging Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and Private Religious
Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 681, 682 (2001). He went on to say,
Contrary to popular impression, the Establishment Clause is not "hostile," nor
is it favorable, to religion; it stands for the proposition that religious activity
and advocacy must be a product of the private judgments of individuals and
groups. If religious activity is instigated, encouraged, or-in the strongest
case-coerced by the government, the government's acts are unconstitutional.
But if religious activity is the product of private judgment, it is permissible-
even welcome-within the public sphere.
Id. He concluded, "Taken together, these decisions suggest, not a 'balance' between
religion and secularism, but a complementary principle that religion is a matter for
private judgment and conviction." Id. at 718. The proposition advanced by Professor
McConnell is further supported by the decision in Zelman.
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Closely related to the distinction between constitutionally
impermissible "aid to the school" and constitutionally permissible "aid to
the child" is the distinction between "aid to the school" and "aid to the
parents of children attending a parochial school." The state assists the
educational function of parochial schools by giving tax benefits to
parents who send their children to parochial schools. Presumably, this
form of aid reduces the costs of parochial school education and,
therefore, provides a financial incentive for parents to send their children
to parochial schools. In Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 6 ' the Court held unconstitutional the state's grant of a
tax credit for school tuition paid by parents whose children were
attending private or parochial schools. The Court reasoned that by
lowering the costs of parochial school education for these parents, the
state was subsidizing parochial school education, and held that this
subsidization violated the Establishment Clause. 16 2 However, in the later
case of Mueller v. Allen, 163 the Court held that there was no
Establishment Clause violation when the state allowed parents across the
board to take a tax deduction, as opposed to a tax credit, for educational
expenses, notwithstanding that ninety-six percent of the deductions were
taken for parochial school tuition.
Some academic commentators were troubled by the implications of
the Mueller decision, especially insofar as it indicated that the
Establishment Clause was not violated simply because the tax deduction
made it easier for parents to exercise a private choice to send their
children to parochial schools.'" There is no doubt that the Court could
161. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
162. Id. at 794.
163. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
164. See Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking
the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 926 (1987). Professor Simson said that
the tax deduction
has a substantial effect of supporting religion with public funds. Although a tax
deduction is not an expenditure of public funds in form, it plainly is so in fact.
Moreover, by relieving parents of a tangible part of the cost of educating their
children in parochial school, this deduction materially increases the likelihood
that parents contemplating sending their children to parochial school will
decide to do so.
Id. See also Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools -
An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 5, 9-10 (1987), in which Professor Choper said that
Mueller is indistinguishable from Nyquist. In both instances, the state was trying to
provide some financial relief to parents who sent their children to private schools,
including parochial schools. Id. at 8. He contends that it should not matter that the law in
Mueller was facially neutral, while the law in Nyquist expressly favored religion, as the
record showed that ninety-six percent of the tax deductions under the law were taken for
parochial school payments. Id. at 9. He concluded that the decision in Mueller "opened a
large window for aid to parochial schools." Id. at 11.
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have held that the tax deduction in Mueller, like the tax credit in Nyquist,
violated the Establishment Clause, because the practical effect of the
deduction was to subsidize parochial school education. However, as will
be discussed in the next section, the Court has consistently held that the
Establishment Clause is not necessarily violated by the inclusion of the
religious with the secular in the provision of a governmental benefit,
such as a tax exemption.16 5 The facial neutrality of the tax deduction in
Mueller enabled the Court to distinguish Nyquist and to bring the case
within the scope of its inclusion precedents. 16 6 The state may provide tax
benefits for parents of all schoolchildren, notwithstanding that most of
the tax benefits are claimed by parents of children attending parochial
schools.
The matter of "aid to the parents of children attending parochial
schools" and "individual choice" proved dispositive in the Court's 2002
decision of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 167 in which the Court first
addressed the question of whether the Establishment Clause prohibited
state-sponsored voucher programs that included vouchers to defray the
cost of attendance at parochial schools. In that case, Ohio had set up a
pilot program designed to increase the choices of lower-income parents
with children in the Cleveland public schools, which, according to the
Court, "have been among the worst performing public schools in the
Nation."l 6 8 The program contained both a tuition aid component and a
tutorial aid component. 169 Under the tuition aid component, private
schools, both non-religious and parochial, could participate in the
program and accept eligible students, so long as the school was located
within the boundaries of the Cleveland school district. 170 Public schools
located in a district adjacent to the Cleveland school district could also
participate in the program. 71 All the participating schools were required
to accept Cleveland school students in accordance with rules
promulgated by the state superintendent.17 2 Tuition aid was distributed to
parents according to financial need. 17 3 If the parents chose a private or
parochial school, "checks [were] made payable to the parents who then
endorsed the checks over to the chosen school." 74
165. See infra notes 201-11 and accompanying text.
166. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983).
167. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
168. Id. at 644.
169. Id. at 645.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 645-46.
173. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646.
174. Id. at 645-46.
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Under the tutorial aid component of the program, grants for tutorial
assistance were provided to students who chose to remain in the public
schools.175 Parents arranged for registered tutors to assist their children
and then submitted bills for those services to the state for payment.'76
The number of tutorial assistance grants offered to students in the district
had to be equal to the number of tuition aid grants provided to students
enrolled at the participating private, parochial, or adjacent public
schools.177 Virtually all of the students participating in the tuition grant
program enrolled in parochial schools.'7 8 In addition to the tuition aid
and tutorial assistance programs, the Cleveland school district set up
programs for community or charter schools, which were funded by the
state but were operated by their own school boards instead of by the
Cleveland school district. 179 For each child enrolled in a community
school, the school received state funding that was twice the funding
received by a school participating in the tuition aid program.' 8s The
school district also operated magnet schools that emphasized a particular
subject area, teaching method, or service to students.' 8' For each student
enrolled in a magnet school, the school district received the same amount
of funding as it received for students enrolled at a traditional public
school.'18 2
Approximately 75,000 students were enrolled in the Cleveland
school district when these programs went into operation.183 About 3,700
students were enrolled in the tuition aid program, about 1,400 received
tutorial assistance, about 1,900 were enrolled in charter schools, and
about 13,000 were enrolled in magnet schools.184
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the inclusion of vouchers for
parochial schools in the Cleveland tuition assistance program did not
violate the Establishment Clause. The opinion of the Court by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined in by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, invoked the "aid to the parent" and "private choice" rationale of
Mueller and other cases.'85 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist:
175. Id. at 640.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 639.
178. Id.
179. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639.
180. Id. at 647.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 647-48.
183. Id. at 644.
184. Id. at 64648.
185. See Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); see also
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. I (1993).
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[These cases] make clear that where a government aid program.
. . is neutral with respect to religion, and that provides assistance
directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their
own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not
readily subject to a challenge under the Establishment Clause.8 6
This was because "[a] program that shares these features permits
government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the
deliberate choice of numerous individual recipients" so that "[t]he
incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived
endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the
individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the
disbursement of the benefits."l 8 7 The Chief Justice went on to point out
that "there [were] no 'financial incentive[s]' that [would] 'ske[w]' the
program toward religious schools," since the aid was "'allocated on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor or disfavor religion,"'
and that in fact the program created "financial disincentives" for
religious schools, with private and parochial schools receiving only half
of the assistance given to charter schools and only one-third of the
assistance given to magnet schools.' 88 He also rejected the contention
that the state was creating a public perception that it was "endorsing
religious practices and beliefs," since the program was a neutral one of
private choice "where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a
result of the numerous independent decisions of private individuals," and
there was no evidence "that the program fail[ed] to provide genuine
options for Cleveland parents to select secular educational opportunities
for their school-age children."' 89
Justices O'Connor and Thomas, in a concurring opinion, insisted that
the decision was not a "dramatic break from the past" and emphasized
that a "true private choice" inquiry "should consider all reasonable
educational alternatives to religious schools that are available to
parents."1 90 Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented,
insisting that public funds would be supporting the teaching of religion
and that this result was not obviated by the fact that the governmental
support for the teaching of religion comes about through "private
choice." 91
186. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 653 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-88).
189. Id. at 654-55.
190. Id. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 699-700 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The Zelman decision provides a roadmap for states and school
districts wishing to adopt voucher programs that include vouchers for
attendance at parochial schools.' 92 The voucher program must be filtered
through the parents of children attending parochial schools and must
include a number of other alternatives to the use of vouchers for
attendance at parochial schools. However, the use of voucher programs
since Zelman has been relatively limited, and while a number of voucher
programs of one sort or another have been adopted, voucher programs,
particularly those that include vouchers for attendance at parochial
schools, have not become a major part of the American educational
system.193
There are three reasons why this has been so. In the first place, the
Court in Zelman made it clear that vouchers for attendance at private and
parochial schools must be only one component of a larger program
involving a number of other alternatives for parents of children enrolled
in the public schools.194 This being so, a state or school district cannot do
vouchers "on the cheap," so to speak, but must devote considerable
resources to providing other alternatives. Second and more importantly,
thirty-nine states have state constitutional "no aid" provisions that
preclude the use of state funds for the support of "sectarian or
denominational schools," 95 and these and related provisions have been
interpreted by some state courts as prohibiting voucher programs that
include vouchers for attendance at parochial schools.1 96 While some
other state courts have upheld these programs against state constitutional
192. See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
193. For discussions of voucher programs since 2002, see JIM CARL, FREEDOM OF
CHOICE: VOUCHERS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 199 (2011) ("The growth of school
vouchers has been anemic since 2002 . . . ."); Lenford C. Sutton & Richard A. King
School Vouchers in a Climate of Political Change, 36 J. EDUC. FIN. 244 (2011);
ALEXANDER USHER & NANCY KOBER, CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT
SCHOOL VOUCHERS: A REVIEW OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND RESEARCH (2011),
available at http://cep-dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentlD=369.
194. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
195. See Sutton & King, supra note 195, at 248-51 (providing a summary of "no aid"
clauses in state constitutions); see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8 ("No public money shall
ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or denominational school, or any
school not under the exclusive control of officers of the public schools."). Sixteen states,
including two that do not have "no aid" clauses, have "uniformity" clauses, providing
that it is the duty of the state to "maintain a uniform public school system." See Sutton &
King, supra note 193, at 247, 261.
196. See Cain v. Home, 202 P.2d 1178 (Ariz. 2009); see also Chittenden Town Sch.
Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999); see also Owens v. Colo. Cong. of
Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933 (Colo. 2004) ("uniformity" provision); see
also Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) ("local control" provision).
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challenge using the rationale of Zelman,197 the fact that in many states
these programs are subject to state constitutional challenge is likely to
inhibit states and school boards in those states from undertaking them.
Third, and probably most importantly, has been the rise in charter
schools, which are publicly-funded, non-sectarian schools operated under
contract between the state or public school systems and private
companies. Charter schools have given parents of children attending
public schools an alternative to avoid the public schools, often with a
greater degree of parental control. The availability of charter schools has
clearly reduced public pressure for voucher programs. '98 Therefore,
while the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of voucher
programs that include vouchers for attendance at parochial schools, such
programs are not widespread in the United States today.199
In the area of aid to religious schools, the Court has drawn a sharp
distinction between constitutionally impermissible "aid to the school"
and constitutionally permissible "aid to the child," including aid to the
parents of children attending parochial schools. However, the Court's
more recent decisions in Mitchell v. Helms and Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris have expanded the definition of "aid to the child/parent,"
continuing a trend followed in earlier cases such as Agostini and Muller,
with the result today that the inclusion of children attending parochial
schools and their parents in benefit and aid programs provided to
children attending public schools and their parents does not violate the
Establishment Clause. What this means in practice is that as a
constitutional matter, the government can provide significant financial
assistance to the educational function of parochial schools.2 00
197. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998); see also Simmons-Harris v.
Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
198. According to Mr. Carl, as of 2010, charter schools operated in forty states and the
District of Columbia, enrolling nearly two million students. He suggested that "[i]n the
first decade of the new century, state legislatures and voters were more attracted to
charter schools than they were to voucher programs, perhaps because charter schools
avoided church state entanglements." CARL, supra note 193, at 199. Today, however, in
some states there are new efforts to establish voucher and tax credit programs. See
Femanda Santos & Motoko Rich, States Shifting Aid for Schools to the Families, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2013, at IA.
199. Id.
200. In an interesting article, Professor Richard C. Schragger said that the effect of the
Zelman v. Harris aid to the parent rationale is to insulate the public subsidization of
private religious activity from Establishment Clause concern and to eliminate inquiry into
matters such as "divertibility" or the "pervasively sectarian" character of the institution to
which the aid flows. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and
Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1810, 1857-58 (2004). The only
constitutional requirement, he said, is one of neutrality and even-handedness. Id.
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3. Equal Treatment ofReligion
The Supreme Court has held that because the Establishment Clause
does not require governmental hostility to religion, the government's
inclusion of the religious with the secular in the receipt of a
governmental benefit does not necessarily violate the Establishment
20 202Clause.20 1 The leading case on this subject is Walz v. Tax Commission,
in which the Court held that a property tax exemption for non-profit
institutions, including churches, did not violate the Establishment Clause.
The inclusion of church property in the exemption was said to promote
"benevolent neutrality" toward religion 203 and avoided the
"entanglement" problems that could result from governmental valuation
of church property for tax purposes and enforcement of the tax against
church property.20
Nonetheless, the property tax exemption for church property
conferred a very valuable financial benefit on churches and, like any
other tax exemption, effectively subsidized the churches' activity. The
effect of Walz is to allow the state to provide a financial benefit to
religion through a tax exemption when it could not provide such a benefit
through a direct grant.205 Crucial to the Court's holding in Walz is the
matter of inclusion. The tax exemption was for non-profit institutions. 20 6
Therefore, churches qualified for the grant not because they were
churches, but because they were included within the class of non-profit
institutions.20 7 As one commentator put it, "those institutions shared a
relevant nonreligious attribute with secular institutions." 208 There is no
doubt that a property tax exemption for churches alone would violate the
Establishment Clause as a preference for religion, notwithstanding that
such an exemption would avoid the "entanglement" problems that the
Court identified in Walz. This point is demonstrated by Texas Monthly,
201. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 669, 671-73.
204. Id. at 674-76.
205. See William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 500-01 (1986). Professor Marshall noted that the
tax exemption in Walz provided a more significant benefit to religion than any other, so
the result is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause objective of prohibiting financial
aid to religion. Id. Professor Choper also attacked the result in Walz as endangering
religious liberty because the effect of the exemption is to allow tax funds to be expended
for religious purposes. See CHOPER, supra note 5, at 37.
206. Walz, 397 U.S. 664.
207. Id. at 679-80.
208. Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J.
1611, 1627 (1993).
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Inc. v. Bullock,209 in which the Court held unconstitutional an exemption
from the state sales tax law for "[p]eriodicals that are published or
distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings
promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of
writings sacred to a religious faith."2 10 In other words, inclusion of the
religious with the secular marks the distinction between the
constitutionally permissible equal treatment of religion and the
constitutionally impermissible preference for religion. 2 11
Because the inclusion of the religious with the secular in the receipt
of a governmental benefit does not necessarily violate the Establishment
Clause, an Establishment Clause violation would only occur when the
inclusion in the particular benefit is inconsistent with a specific
Establishment Clause principle or doctrine.2 12 In the previous section, we
have discussed governmental financial assistance to the educational
function of parochial schools. We have seen that the Court has drawn a
sharp distinction between "aid to the school" and "aid to the
child/parent." Governmental financial assistance that takes the form of
"aid to the school," such as paying the salaries of parochial school
teachers of secular subjects, violates the Establishment Clause,
notwithstanding that the government also pays the salaries of teachers of
secular subjects in the public schools.2 13 The government would also
violate the Establishment Clause by sending public school teachers of
basic subjects into the parochial schools, since this form of financial
assistance would "relieve sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would
have borne in educating their students" and would "have the effect of
advancing religion by creating a financial incentive to undertake
sectarian education." 2 14 The same would be true of a program providing
grants to both parochial and public schools for the repair of school
buildings.2 15 Similarly, in Mitchell v. Helms,216 a Court majority held that
209. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
210. Id. at 5.
211. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 115, 184 (1992). As Professor McConnell has observed,
When the government provides no financial support to the nonprofit sector
except for churches, it aids religion. But when the government provides
financial support to the entire nonprofit sector, religious and nonreligious
institutions alike, on the basis of objective criteria, it does not aid religion. It
aids higher education, health care, or child care; it is neutral to religion.
Id.
212. Id.
213. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
214. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 229-30; see also supra notes 137-143 and
accompanying text.
215. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
216. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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the Establishment Clause required that the loan of materials and
equipment to parochial school students be accompanied with adequate
standards to prevent divertibility of the materials and equipment for
religious purposes. If that requirement had not been satisfied, the
program would have been unconstitutional as "aid to the school" in
violation of the Establishment Clause notwithstanding that the same
benefit was provided to public school students.2 17
But when the inclusion of the religious with the secular in the
particular benefit is not inconsistent with a specific Establishment Clause
principle or doctrine, such as when the particular benefit takes the form
of "aid to the child," it is the inclusion of the religious with the secular
that makes the giving of the benefit constitutionally permissible. For the
same reason, when the state establishes a program to enable students
with disabilities to receive an education so that they can acquire a
marketable skill, the state does not violate the Establishment Clause by
paying the tuition of a blind student to attend a sectarian college in order
to receive an education that would enable him to pursue a religious
vocation. 2 18 The purpose of the program was to enable students with
disabilities to receive an education so that they could acquire a
marketable skill, and the most logical place for him to do so would be at
a sectarian college.219
217. Id.
218. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
219. Here, as in Zelman, this was a government program that was "neutral with respect
to religion and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice." Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
However, while the state is permitted by the Establishment Clause to include
religious study in a program of financial assistance to college students, it is not required
by the Free Exercise Clause to do so. For this reason, a state does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause when it denies financial assistance to a student pursuing a degree in
"devotional theology." Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). The state's refusal to
provide financial assistance to a student pursuing a degree in "devotional theology" was
based on a "no aid" provision in the state constitution, WASH. CONST., art. 1, § 11, which
states, "'No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment."' Id. at
719 n.2. The Court held that the ban on funding for study in devotional theology
advanced a valid state "anti-establishment" interest and that the state provided
scholarships for study at pervasively sectarian institutions so long as the student was not
pursuing a degree in devotional theology. Locke, 540 U.S. at 724-25. Compare Colo.
Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008), in which the Court found
unconstitutional a state scholarship program that provided funding for students attending
sectarian institutions but denied funding for students attending institutions that were
"pervasively sectarian" on the ground that it distinguishes between religions. See also the
discussion of Locke in Richard C. Schragger, supra note 200, at 1859-66, in which the
author pointed out that the holding in Locke means that the principle of government
neutrality does not require that the state treat religion and nonreligion equally. Rather, the
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To take another example of the permissible inclusion of the religious
with the secular, in a series of cases, the Court has held that providing
religious groups with equal access to public facilities for purposes of
expression does not violate the Establishment Clause. Such access,
standing alone, does not have the effect of advancing religion; it does not
create a symbolic union between government and religion, nor does it
constitute governmental endorsement of the religious group's message.
At this point, the freedom of expression component of the First
Amendment comes into play. Under the First Amendment public forum
doctrine, whenever the government designates public property or
facilities as a public forum, it must provide all groups equal access to the
property for the purpose of expression. Since providing equal access to
religious groups for purposes of expression does not violate the
Establishment Clause, the government is constitutionally required to
provide such access under the First Amendment public forum doctrine. 2 20
We see, then, that the Court has gone quite far in holding that the
inclusion of the religious with the secular in the receipt of a
governmental benefit does not violate the Establishment Clause. It has
upheld the inclusion of religious institutions in tax exemptions for non-
profit institutions. It has upheld the inclusion of parochial school students
with public school students in benefits provided to school children that
come within the ambit of "aid to the child" and scholarship programs that
include students wishing to engage in religious study. It has held that
providing religious groups with equal access to public facilities does not
violate the Establishment Clause, so that such access is required by the
First Amendment principle of content neutrality. An Establishment
Clause violation will occur only when the inclusion in the particular
question in such a situation is whether the resulting differential treatment of religion
"burdened a fundamental right of religious exercise." Id. at 1862. The author also
maintained that "Establishment Clause values point toward the validity of Washington's"
exclusion of the study of "devotional theology" from the scholarship program. Id. at
1864.
220. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)
(involving a statehouse plaza dedicated as a public forum); see also Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (involving the after-school use
of school facilities by private groups); see also Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (involving facilities of public schools available for use by
student groups); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (involving facilities of
state university available for use by student groups); see also Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (considering a university's policy of paying
printing costs of student publications as applied to require payment of printing costs for
publication of student religious organization); see also John H. Garvey, All Things Being
Equal, BYU L. REv. 587, 588-92 (1996) (discussing the interaction between the
Establishment Clause, the First Amendment public forum doctrine, and the content
neutrality principle in this situation).
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benefit is inconsistent with a particular Establishment Clause principle or
doctrine. The result has been that the Establishment Clause, which
requires only neutrality and not hostility toward religion, has not been
interpreted as prohibiting the government from providing significant
financial benefits to religious persons and religious institutions. 221
C. Governmental Action Purportedly Advancing Religion
The Supreme Court cases in this category primarily involve
constitutional challenges to governmental displays that consist of or
include religious symbols, such as nativity scenes or the Ten
Commandments. These displays will be found to be unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause if they were adopted for the purpose of
advancing religion (in violation of the first Lemon principle) or would
appear to an objective observer to have the effect of advancing religion
(in violation of the second Lemon principle). 2 22
In the earlier article, I discussed the two Supreme Court cases
dealing with the constitutionality of Christmas holiday season displays
involving a nativity scene and a Chanukah menorah.223 In the first case to
reach the Court, Lynch v. Donnelly,224 the Court held in a 5-4 decision
that the inclusion of a nativity scene in a governmentally-sponsored
Christmas holiday season display, which contained a Santa Claus,
Christmas trees, toy animals, and the other secular symbols of Christmas,
did not violate the Establishment Clause. The plurality opinion of Chief
Justice Burger saw the primary effect of the display to be the celebration
of the Christmas season by the display of its traditional symbols, such as
a nativity scene, and the first part of the Burger opinion seemed to be
saying that as long as the symbol used was a traditional one, even if
221. See Volokh, supra note 90, at 365-73 (discussing the constitutional mandate of
equal treatment).
222. Two points should be noted here. First, as discussed in connection with the
subsidiary doctrine of secular deism, see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text,
religion has long been a very important part of American life, and practices that were
historically religious have lost their religious significance through long usage in a secular
context. Second, as discussed in connection with the subsidiary doctrine of primary effect
and incidental benefit, see supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text, when the primary
effect of a governmental action is to advance a secular purpose, that action does not
violate the Establishment Clause merely because it provides an "incidental benefit" to
religion. In light of these subsidiary doctrines, the fact that a governmental display
consists of or includes a historically religious symbol does not necessarily render the
display unconstitutional. The constitutional question depends on whether the display was
adopted for a religious purpose or has the effect of advancing religion.
223. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1400-03.
224. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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purely religious in nature, the display did not have the primary effect of
advancing religion, so that any benefit to religion was "incidental."22 5
The crucial fifth vote to uphold the constitutionality of the display
was cast by Justice O'Connor, and in her concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor set forth what subsequently became the "endorsement" part of
the endorsement/symbolic union doctrine.2 26 The question for her was
whether the display would be perceived by an objective observer as
sending a message of endorsement of Christianity.2 27 She concluded that
the display would not be perceived as sending a message of endorsement,
because the inclusion of the nativity scene along with all the secular
symbols of Christmas did no more than acknowledge the historically
religious origin of what had now become a secular holiday.228 The
second part of the Burger opinion likewise emphasized the fact that the
nativity scene was included as a part of a larger holiday season display
and that in that context it was an acknowledgment of the historical origin
of the holiday.229
A reader of the Burger and O'Connor opinions would probably
conclude that Burger would vote to uphold the constitutionality of a
nativity scene display standing alone, while O'Connor would probably
find the unadorned display unconstitutional. When that question came
before the Court in the 1989 case of County of Allegheny v. ACLU,23 0
O'Connor joined the four Lynch dissenters. The Court held, in another 5-
4 decision, that the display of an unadorned nativity scene would send a
message of endorsement of Christianity, thus violating the
endorsement/symbolic union doctrine and the advancing or inhibiting
religion Lemon principle. 23 1 However, in line with the holding in Lynch,
the Court in County of Allegheny also held that the inclusion of a
Chanukah menorah as part of a "salute to liberty" display, next to a large
Christmas tree and a "Salute to Liberty" sign, did not send a message of
endorsement of religion and so was constitutionality permissible.2 32
The applicable doctrine emerging from these cases would seem to
make the determination of the constitutionality of governmental displays
of religious symbols very fact-specific.233 The display of a particular
religious symbol in the circumstances presented cannot convey to an
225. Id. at 673-78.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 692-95.
229. Id. at 680-87.
230. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
231. Id. at 616-21.
232. Id. at 616-18, 632-37.
233. Id. at 573.
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objective observer a message of endorsement of religion.2 34 If the display
conveys such a message of endorsement, then it has the effect of
advancing religion and is unconstitutional.235 If the display does not
convey this message of endorsement, then it does not have the effect of
advancing religion and is constitutionally permissible, despite any
* 236
"incidental benefit" to religion.
However, the result of the Court's application of this doctrine to the
displays involved in Lynch and County of Allegheny is to permit
governmental bodies to display the religious symbols of a nativity scene
and a Chanukah menorah at Christmas time, so long as the display
includes some secular symbols such as a Christmas tree or the proverbial
"Santa Claus and three reindeer." 237 In those cases, the purpose of the
display was found to be the secular one of celebrating the holiday season
by its traditional symbols, even though some of the symbols were
religious, thus satisfying the first Lemon principle. In addition, because
some secular symbols have been included in the display, the display was
found not to constitute an endorsement of religion, thus satisfying the
second Lemon principle. In effect, the view of the Burger plurality in
Lynch that the government may celebrate Christmas with a nativity scene
or other religious symbol has prevailed, subject only to the requirement
that the display include a Christmas tree or the proverbial "Santa Claus
and three reindeer." 23 8 Thus, the issue is now settled with respect to
Christmas holiday season displays.
In 2005, the Court decided two cases dealing with Ten
Commandments displays that will now provide guidance as to the
constitutional permissibility of other displays containing religious
symbols. 2 39 The Court had long before held that the display of the Ten
Commandments in a public school classroom was the display of a sacred
text of the Jewish and Christian religions and so violated the
Establishment Clause. 24 0 In McCreary County v. ACL U, 24 1 the Court
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. 573.
237. See id.; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
238. I was unsuccessful in my efforts to persuade the Sixth Circuit to invalidate a
Christmas display that I claimed was "dominated" by a nativity scene, arguing that the
addition of some of the secular symbols of Christmas did not alter the message of
endorsement of Christianity conveyed by the "dominant" nativity scene. The court
rejected the contention, stating that "dominance" was not the test and that looking to the
location of the display and the context of the celebration of Christmas as a national
holiday, the display as a whole did not send an impermissible message of endorsement.
See Doe v. City of Clawson, 915 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1990).
239. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677 (2005).
240. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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dealt with the situation in which two Kentucky counties had posted a
copy of the Ten Commandments in county buildings. In the first county,
the county legislative body adopted a resolution that the display "be
posted in a very high traffic area of the courthouse."2 42 In the second
county, the Ten Commandments "were hung in a ceremony presided
over by the county [j]udge-[e]xecutive" accompanied by a pastor.243
After a civil liberties organization brought a federal suit against the
counties that sought to enjoin the displays on the ground that they
violated the Establishment Clause, "the legislative body of each [c]ounty
authorized a second, expanded display" of the Ten Commandments. 24
The counties recited "that the Ten Commandments are the precedent
legal code upon which the civil and criminal codes of. .. Kentucky are
founded," along with eight other historical documents that either had a
religious theme or were excerpted to highlight a religious element.2 45 The
District Court found that both displays violated the Establishment Clause
under the first Lemon principle in that they were both enacted solely for a
religious purpose.2 46
The counties then posted a new display consisting of a framed copy
of the Ten Commandments and nine other documents, including "the
Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the
lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the National
Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady
Justice." 24 7 The copy of the Ten Commandments contained a comment
explaining how "[t]he Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced
the formation of Western legal thought and the formation of our
country."24 8 The District Court found that the purpose of the third display
was a religious one to post the Ten Commandments and so was
unconstitutional.24 9 A divided Sixth Circuit affirmed.2 50
The Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that the "Foundations of
American Law and Government Display" violated the Establishment
Clause.25 1 The majority opinion by Justice Souter, joined in by Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the religious purpose
principle of Lemon was required by the overriding Establishment Clause
241. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
242. Id. at 851.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 852-53.
245. Id. at 853.
246. Id. at 851-54.
247. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 856.
248. Id. at 855-56.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 857-58.
251. Id. at 881.
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principle of complete official neutrality toward religion and found that
there was "ample support for the District Court's finding of a
predominantly religious purpose behind the counties' third display."25 2
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and in
large part Justice Kennedy, dissented primarily on the ground that if the
effect of the display would not be to advance religion, the display should
not be held unconstitutional because of a finding of a religious purpose
behind the display. 2 53 Implicit in the Court's holding was that if the
counties had simply provided for a "Foundations of American Law and
Government Display" without the past history of the two Ten
Commandments displays and obvious efforts to promote the Ten
Commandments, there would have been no Establishment Clause
violation. The Court stated, "Nor do we have occasion here to hold that a
sacred text can never be integrated constitutionally into a government
display on the subject of law, or American history," noting that the frieze
in the Supreme Court courtroom includes the figure of Moses holding the
text of the later secularly-phrased Commandments in the company of
seventeen other lawgivers (most of which were secular figures) and that
"there is no risk that Moses would strike an observer as evidence that the
National Government was violating neutrality in religion." 2 54 The
significance of McCreary, then, is that it enables opponents of a
government display containing religious symbols to assert a successful
challenge to the display on the ground that it was undertaken for a
religious purpose in violation of the first Lemon principle.2 55
In the companion case of Van Orden v. Perry,256 the Court held, 5-4,
with Justice Breyer changing sides, that the inclusion of a Ten
Commandments monument-presented to the State of Texas by a private
civic organization in 1961 and located in a display on a twenty-two acre
area of the Texas State Capitol's grounds that contained "[seventeen]
monuments and [twenty-one] historical markers, commemorating the
people, ideals and events that compose Texan identity"-did not violate
the Establishment Clause. The plurality opinion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined in by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
maintained that the Establishment Clause did not preclude the
government from recognizing and acknowledging the religious heritage
of the American people and that the inclusion of the Ten Commandments
among the monuments and historical markers in the large display on the
capitol grounds "has a dual significance partaking of both religion and
252. Id. at 873-81.
253. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 885, 900-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 874.
255. Id. at 881.
256. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
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government."257 Justice Breyer said that this was a "borderline case," but
in light of the context of the display, the secular aspects of the display
predominated over the religious ones, so that the display was not
inconsistent with the basic purposes of the Religion Clauses."258 Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented, essentially
contending that the display of the Ten Commandments monument
violated the Establishment Clause because it contained only a religious
message and thus had the purpose and effect of advancing religion.25 9
In effect, Van Orden does for the Ten Commandments and other
religious monuments what Lynch and Allegheny County did for nativity
scenes and Chanukah menorahs. 26 0 The Ten Commandments and other
religious monuments may be included in a display along with secular
monuments so long as there is a secular purpose for the display.261 This
would mean that the "Foundations of American Law and Government
Display" involved in McCreary would have been upheld as
constitutional if the Court had not found that, in light of the two previous
efforts to display the Ten Commandments alone, the display was
undertaken for a religious purpose in violation of the first Lemon
principle. As a practical matter, when government officials want to
sponsor a Ten Commandments display, it is usually because they want to
proclaim their "religiosity" to the public, and this would mean that they
have a religious purpose for the display in violation of the first Lemon
principle. The likely effect of McCreary and Van Orden, then, is that
older displays containing the Ten Commandments along with secular
monuments or documents are likely to be upheld against Establishment
Clause challenge because usually it can be shown that the display was
designed to advance a secular purpose.262 However, public officials are
not likely to want to promote a new display containing the Ten
Commandments because they cannot publicly proclaim their
"religiosity" when they do so. For this reason, we are not likely to see
many new displays containing the Ten Commandments along with
secular documents.
257. Id. at 684-92 (plurality opinion).
258. Id. at 700-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
259. Id. at 707-47 (dissenting opinions of Stevens, J., O'Connor, J., and Souter, J.).
260. See generally id.
261. Id. at 682-83.
262. See, for example, Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008), in
which the Ninth Circuit held that the city's display of a Ten Commandments monument
donated to it by a private organization in 1959 did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 1019-20. This was because the city could assert a secular purpose for the display of
the monument, and there were secular monuments, such as three war memorial
monoliths, in the vicinity of the Ten Commandments monument. The court relied
primarily on Justice Breyer's analysis in Van Orden. See id at 1017-21.
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Another consequence of Van Orden is to reaffirm that part of
Allegheny County that holds that a display of a religious symbol standing
alone violates the Establishment Clause because it sends a message of
endorsement of religion.263 This means that even if the display was not
undertaken for a religious purpose and so did not violate the first Lemon
principle, the fact that it sends a message of endorsement of religion
violates the second Lemon principle and so renders it violative of the
Establishment Clause.2 64 Looking to post- Van Orden lower court cases,
the Tenth Circuit has held unconstitutional a memorial display erected by
the Utah Highway Patrol Association on public land to honor the
memory of fallen troopers, which consisted of twelve-foot high crosses
with six-foot horizontal cross-bars, each containing the fallen trooper's
name and other information. The court found that the display did not
violate the first Lemon principle, but because it consisted of the Latin
cross ("unequivocally a symbol of the Christian faith"), it conveyed a
message of endorsement of Christianity, violated the second Lemon
principle, and was unconstitutional.265 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held
unconstitutional the display of a forty-three-foot Latin cross atop Mount
Soledad in the La Jolla community of San Diego, California.2 66 At the
time of the litigation, the land on which the cross was erected had been
sold to the United States government, and pursuant to an Act of
Congress, the monument had been designated as a national memorial
honoring veterans of the United States Armed Forces.267 The Ninth
Circuit found that despite the addition of some secular symbols to the
memorial, the cross stood out-it was visible from miles away and
towered over the thousands of drivers who traveled daily on the interstate
highway below-and so sent a message of endorsement of Christianity in
violation of the Establishment Clause.26 8
While challenges to governmental displays containing religious
symbols may be expected to continue, the Supreme Court has set forth
applicable constitutional doctrine with reference to the first two Lemon
principles. The use of religious symbols in the display will violate the
Establishment Clause if it can be shown that the purpose for doing so
263. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677.
264. Id.
265. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 637 F.3d 1095, 1120 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 2008)), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 12 (2011).
266. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 2535 (2012) (holding that the cross was a sectarian war memorial honoring only
members of a particular religion).
267. Id. at 1102-06.
268. Id.
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was a religious one. 26 9 If a religious purpose cannot be shown, the use of
religious symbols in the display will violate the Establishment Clause
only if the display of the religious symbol in the circumstances presented
would convey to an objective observer a message of endorsement of
religion. This will usually be the case where the religious symbol, such
as a nativity scene or a Ten Commandments monument, stands alone
without any secular symbols. 270 When the display includes secular
symbols, it is likely that it will be found not to convey a message of
endorsement and so will not violate the Establishment Clause.27 1
In the earlier article, going beyond governmental displays containing
religious symbols, I discussed a number of lower court cases dealing
with the matter of "advancing religion" in various contexts. These
included matters such as court-mandated attendance of persons convicted
of alcohol or substance abuse violations at support programs sponsored
by religious organizations, inclusion of representatives of religious
organizations in governmental advisory bodies and the like, and
delegation of law enforcement authority to a religious organization. 27 2 1
said at the time that "[i]t is in this area especially that the lower courts
must apply settled Supreme Court doctrine and precedent to resolve a
myriad of questions, and, for the time being at least, they are likely to
269. For a criticism of what the author calls the Court's "actor-focused approach to the
constitutional permissibility of religious displays," see Judge Edith Brown Clement,
Public Displays of Affection. .. For God: Religious Monuments After McCreary and Van
Orden, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231 (2009).
270. For a criticism of the endorsement test, in particular as it relates to what the author
calls "The Regulation of Local Expression," see Schragger, supra note 200, at 1875-80.
271. In this connection, mention should be made of Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700
(2010). In 1934, a veteran's organization mounted a large Latin Cross on Sunrise Rock in
the Mojave National Preserve as a memorial to soldiers who died in World War I. Id. at
705-10. While a lawsuit challenging the display of the Latin Cross as violative of the
Establishment Clause was pending, Congress passed a law designating the cross and
adjoining land as a national memorial and later passed a land transfer law directing the
Secretary of the Interior to transfer to the veterans organization the government's interest
in the land that had been designated a national memorial in exchange for land elsewhere
in the Preserve. Id. A federal appeals court found that the transfer was invalid as an
attempt to keep the cross atop Sunrise Rock. Id. A badly-splintered Supreme Court
reversed the injunction issued by the federal court and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Id. at 722. Three Justices indicated their view that the transfer probably did
not violate the Establishment Clause, id. at 719-20 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.
and Alito, J.); two Justices found that the plaintiff lacked standing, id. at 727-36 (Scalia,
J., joined by Thomas, J.); and four Justices dissented, three of whom indicated their view
that there was an Establishment Clause violation, id. at 736-60 (Stevens, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J. and Sotomayor, J.). Justice Breyer dissented on the ground that the issuance
of the injunction should have been affirmed. Salazar, 559 U.S. at 760-64 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). There are no further reported decisions in this case at the present time.
272. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1405-08.
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,,273hahave the final say on the resolution of these questions. Nothing has
changed in the intervening years. No cases dealing with other matters of
"advancing religion" have come before the Supreme Court, and the
lower federal courts will continue to resolve those cases in accordance
with settled Supreme Court doctrine and precedent as they arise.
We may conclude the consideration of "advancing religion" with a
discussion of Marsh v. Chambers 274 and what may be called the
"legislative prayer" exception to the law of the Establishment Clause. In
Marsh, the Court held that the opening of sessions of Congress and other
legislative bodies with prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause,
because Congress followed this practice at the time the First Amendment
was adopted. 275 The Court explicitly refused to apply the Lemon
principles to the practice of legislative prayer.276 If it had, it would have
been compelled to declare legislative prayer unconstitutional because
legislative prayer clearly has the effect of advancing religion in the same
manner as prayer in school or prayer at a high school commencement.
For whatever reason, in Marsh, a majority of the Court was persuaded
that it should look to historical context, and so the Court upheld
legislative prayer.277 Precisely because Marsh was based on historical
acceptance of the challenged practice rather than on the "law of the
Establishment Clause," and because it is difficult to find any other
example of historical acceptance of a religious practice, Marsh is not a
precedent that is capable of extension. Thus, when the Fourth Circuit was
called upon to determine the constitutionality of judicial prayer in the
courtroom, it had no difficulty in limiting Marsh to its precise facts and
in invalidating judicial courtroom prayer on the ground that it had the
effect of advancing religion.278 Similarly, two other circuits, in cases
some years apart, have held that school board meetings, where students
are often in attendance in order to receive awards and for other purposes,
are more like school classrooms than legislative chambers, so that the
legislative prayer exception does not apply and that the saying of prayers
is unconstitutional.27 9 In addition, in a number of cases, courts, seeing
Marsh and County of Allegheny as teaching "that a legislative body
cannot . . . 'exploit' the prayer opportunity to 'affiliate' the Government
273. Id. at 1408.
274. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
275. Id. at 787-88.
276. Id. at 791.
277. Id. at 787-88.
278. See N.C. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir.
1991).
279. See Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Indian
River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2011).
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with one specific faith or belief in preference to others,"2 80 have held that
governmental bodies violated the Establishment Clause by using only
Christian ministers and Christian prayers.281 Marsh stands as an anomaly
in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and except for the
result in the case itself, it is not a meaningful part of that jurisprudence
and of the "law of the Establishment Clause."
D. Entanglement: Governmental Interference in Religious Matters
The cases discussed in this part of the Article involve the third
Lemon principle of excessive entanglement. This principle means, first,
that the civil courts may not become involved with matters of religious
doctrine or policy and must defer to the resolution of these issues by the
highest tribunal of a hierarchical church authority. Thus, the courts
cannot interfere with the decisions of the appropriate ecclesiastical
authority within the church as to what persons are entitled to serve as
ecclesiastical officials.2 82 Nor may they become involved in disputes
between church factions over control of church property, with each
group claiming to have the "true faith." 28 3 Again, the courts must defer to
the determination of this matter by the highest tribunal of a hierarchical
church organization.2 84 However, when the form of church organization
is congregational rather than hierarchical, the courts may, consistent with
the Establishment Clause, apply general principles of contract and
property law to determine which of the contending factions is entitled to
the church property.285
280. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2004).
281. See id.; see also Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388 (2013); see also Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir.
2011).
The process by which the legislative body selects members of the clergy to
deliver the prayers must be "religiously neutral" and cannot exclude particular religions
from the selection process. See, e.g., Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.
2008). For recent cases upholding the constitutionality of the legislative body's selection
process, see Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2013), and Atheists of
Fla. v. City of Lakeland, 713 F.3d 577 (11th Cir. 2013).
282. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); see also
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 280 U.S. I (1929).
283. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696; see also Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1.
284. See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). These
cases and the cases cited in the preceding footnote were recently discussed by the
Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 704-05 (2012), during the course of which the Court observed that "[o]ur
decisions in that area confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a
church's determination of who can act as its ministers."
285. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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Second, the excessive entanglement principle may prevent
application of general laws to the activities of religious organizations. In
this context, the excessive entanglement principle of the Establishment
Clause may overlap with the Free Exercise Clause, but there is an
important difference. The application of general laws to the activities of
religious organizations would only raise a Free Exercise concern if that
application significantly interfered with the ability of the religious
organization to carry out its religious function. In the earlier article, I said
that under current Free Exercise doctrine, that showing seemingly would
be very difficult to make, since the Court has, for the most part, rejected
the claim of a "Free-Exercise required exemption" from generally
applicable laws.2 86 However, in the recently decided case of Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission,287 that showing was made with respect to the
application of the ministerial exception to anti-discrimination laws so as
to bar a discrimination suit brought by a teacher at a parochial school
who had the status of a "minister" under church law. As Chief Justice
Roberts observed in his opinion for the Court, "The Establishment
Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free
Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious
groups to select their own." 288 He also pointed out that while in some
cases there may be an "internal tension" between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, that was not so in this case because
"[b]oth Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the
decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers."2 89
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court for the first time specifically held that
under both of these clauses, there was a ministerial exception to the
operation of federal laws prohibiting discrimination in employment.290
As the Chief Justice stated,
By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to
286. See, e.g., Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(holding no exemption from substance abuse laws for the use of peyote in the religious
ceremonies of the Native American Church).
287. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 694.
288. Id. at 703.
289. Id. at 702.
290. He noted that the federal courts of appeal "have had extensive experience [in
dealing] with this issue" in the context "of Title V1l of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., and other employment discrimination laws" and "have uniformly
recognized the existence of a 'ministerial exception,' grounded in the First Amendment,
that precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning the employment
relationship between a religious institution and its ministers." Id. at 705.
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shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.
According the state the power to determine which individuals
will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment
Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such
ecclesiastical decisions.29 1
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court not only recognized a ministerial
exception to the operation of anti-discrimination laws but held that in this
case the question of whether the particular employee came within the
exception had to be determined by the religious doctrine of the church
employer. The employee in this case was a member of the Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod and was employed as a teacher at Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, a small Lutheran
parochial school operated by a Lutheran congregation that "offer[ed] a
Christ-centered education to students in kindergarten through eighth
grade."292 But under church law, she was considered a "called" teacher
rather than a lay teacher.29 3
[While the school board appointed lay teachers,] called teachers
[were] regarded as having been called to their vocation by God
through a congregation. To be eligible to receive a call from a
congregation, a teacher [had to] satisfy certain academic
requirements. One way of doing so [was] by completing a
"colloquy" program at a Lutheran college or university. The
program require[d] candidates to take eight courses of
theological study, obtain the endorsement of their local Synod
district and pass an oral examination by a faculty committee. A
teacher who [met] these requirements [could] be "called" by a
[local] congregation. Once "called," a teacher [would] receive
the formal title of "Minister of Religion, Commissioned." A
commissioned minister serve[d] for an open-ended term, and at
Hosanna-Tabor, a call could only be rescinded for cause and by a
supermajority vote of the congregation.29 4
The employee here was a "called" teacher.29 5 She taught secular
courses and "also taught a religion class four days a week, led the
students in prayer and devotional exercises each day, and attended a
weekly school-wide chapel service, [which she led] herself about twice a
291. Id. at 706.
292. Id. at 699.
293 Hnsanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct at 699.
294. Id. at 699.
295. Id. at 700.
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year." 2 96 When she became ill with narcolepsy, the congregation put her
on disability leave and later concluded that it was unlikely that she would
be physically capable of returning to work in the future. 297 The
congregation offered her a "peaceful release" from her call and tried to
negotiate her resignation from the school.298 She refused and threatened
legal action against the congregation. 2 99 The congregation then voted to
rescind her call and sent her a letter of termination.300
The United States EEOC brought suit against Hosanna-Tabor,
alleging that the employee had been fired in retaliation for threatening to
file a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),30 1 and the
employee joined the suit, asserting a claim for unlawful retaliation both
under the ADA and the state disabilities rights law.3 02 The suit sought her
reinstatement to her former position and monetary relief.303 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized the existence of
a ministerial exemption barring certain employment discrimination
claims against religious institutions, but the court held that the employee
did not qualify as a "minister" under the exception, because the duties of
"called" teachers at the school were the same as the duties of lay
teachers.
The Supreme Court, citing the above cases which held that the courts
cannot interfere with the decisions of the appropriate ecclesiastical
authority within the church as to which persons are entitled to serve as
ecclesiastical officials305 and distinguishing the cases holding that there
was no Free Exercise-mandated exception for neutral laws of general
application, 306 held that as a constitutional matter, the ministerial
exemption had to apply in this case.307 The Court found that it was highly
relevant that Hosanna-Tabor held the employee out to be a "minister"
after she had completed a course of religious training, and that it was less
relevant both that lay teachers performed the same religious duties as the
"called" teacher and that the "called" teacher also performed secular
296. Id.
297. Id. at 700.
298. Id.
299. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct at 700.
300. Id.
301. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
302. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 701-02.
305. Wynne v. Great Falls, S.C., 376 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2004).
306. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that
state substance abuse laws could constitutionally be applied to the use of peyote in the
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church).
307. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706-07.
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duties.308 What appeared to be dispositive for the Court was that the
church was entitled to decide who would be its ministers, and the
ministerial exception "ensures that the authority to select and control
who will minister to the faithful-a matter 'strictly ecclesiastical'-is the
church's alone."309
However, totally apart from an interference with the religious
freedom of a religious organization and the entitlement of a church to
"select and control who will be minister to the faithful," there is the
Establishment Clause concern that the application of a regulatory law to
the activities of a religious organization would "entangle" the
government in the determination of religious matters that are more
properly the province of the religious organization. In NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 310 the Supreme Court, invoking the statutory
interpretation principle that, when possible, a statute will be interpreted
so as to avoid a serious question as to its constitutionality, held that
Congress did not intend that the National Labor Relations Act31' would
apply to the unionization of lay faculty members at parochial schools.312
The Court noted that in Lemon, it had found an "entanglement" between
the teaching of the religious and the secular in parochial schools and that
the Board's resolution of unfair labor practices at the schools would, in
many instances, involve an inquiry into the good faith of the position
asserted by clergy-administrators and its relationship to the schools'
308. Id. at 708-09.
309. Id. at 709 (citations omitted). The Court concluded:
The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination
statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups
in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith and carry out their
mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her
termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for
us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.
Id. at 710. The Court noted that it was not deciding in this case whether or not the
ministerial exception would bar other types of suits by an employee against a church
employer, including actions alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by the church
employer. Id.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas stated that the fact that the church
considered the employee a minister should be dispositive. Id. at 710-11 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). In another concurring opinion, Justices Alito and Kagan emphasized that the
formal ordination and designation of a church employee as a "minister" should not be
controlling in deciding whether the church is entitled to invoke the ministerial exemption.
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711-16 (Alito, J., concurring). They pointed out that the
use of the term "minister" or concept of ordination was not followed by some religious
groups and that what mattered here was that the employee performed important religious
functions, so the church alone had the right to decide for itself whether she was
religiously qualified to remain in her office. 132 S. Ct. at 711-16 (Alito, J., concurring).
310. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
311. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
312. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504-07.
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"religious mission."3 1 3 Because of these "entanglement" concerns, the
Court concluded that Congress did not intend that the Act would apply to
the unionization of lay faculty members at parochial schools.314 The
Court has also held that Congress did not intend that non-profit, church-
affiliated schools would be subject to federal unemployment
compensation laws.1 However, the Court saw no constitutional problem
in applying the federal wages and hours law to a commercial business
operated by a religious organization and staffed by former drug addicts,
derelicts, or criminals before their conversion and rehabilitation by the
foundation. 3 16 Nor did the Court see any constitutional problem in the
application of a state sales and use tax to a religious organization's sale
of religious materials. 3 17
Because Catholic Bishop was decided on statutory interpretation
grounds, it does not serve as a binding precedent with respect to the
application of the Act to non-faculty employees of parochial schools or
the application of other federal laws to the activities of religious
313. Id. at 501-02. The Court also quoted the following language from Lemon: .'The
substantial religious character of these church-related schools gives rise to entangling
church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid."' Id. at 503
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971)).
314. Id. at 506.
315. St. Martin Lutheran Evangelical Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981).
This decision was based primarily on general principles of statutory interpretation rather
than on a concern with avoiding a serious constitutional question.
316. Troy & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). The
foundation was a nonprofit religious organization that operated a number of commercial
businesses, including service stations, retail clothing and grocery outlets, roofing and
electrical construction companies, a candy company, and a motel. Id. at 292. The
converted and rehabilitated workers received no cash salaries but were provided with
"food, clothing, shelter, and other benefits." Id. The district court found that these
workers were "employees" within the meaning of the federal wages and hours law under
the "economic reality" test of employment. Id. at 293-94. The Court held that the
application of the law to the foundation's commercial businesses did not implicate the
Free Exercise Clause because the required payments in cash to the workers, which they
could voluntarily return to the foundation, did not in any way interfere with their
religious beliefs. Id. at 303-05. The foundation's "entanglement" objection to the record
keeping requirements of the law was rejected on the ground that the routine and factual
inquires required by the law "bear no resemblance to the kind of government surveillance
the Court has previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government entanglement
with religion." Id. at 305.
317. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378
(1990); see also Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (holding that the Internal
Revenue Code's deduction for contributions to charitable and religious institutions did
not include fixed fees paid for spiritual auditing and training services, because the
payments were made in exchange for something of value). The Court noted that
disallowing such a deduction avoided Establishment Clause problems because it did not
require the Internal Revenue Service to decide which services and benefits were religious
in nature. Id. at 694-98.
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organizations. Likewise, because the Court avoided the constitutional
question in that case, it is not a precedent on the question of whether the
application of a particular law to the activities of a religious organization
violates the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause. Some
subsequent lower court cases, discussed in the earlier article, have dealt
with these questions and have held both that the law applied and that its
application in the particular case did not violate the Establishment Clause
or the Free Exercise Clause. The Ninth Circuit held that Catholic Bishop
was limited to the unionization of teachers at a parochial school and that
the National Labor Relations Act did apply to the unionization of non-
faculty personnel, such as child-care workers, cooks, recreation
assistants, and maintenance workers at a Catholic school for boys.3 18 The
court also found that the exercise of jurisdiction over the unionization of
these employees did not violate the Establishment Clause." 9 Because the
duties of these employees were overwhelmingly secular, the Board's
exercise of jurisdiction over them would not involve the Board in the
school's religious mission, nor would there be any governmental
monitoring of the school's religious activities.320 And contrary to the
interpretation given to the National Labor Relations Act by the United
States Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the Minnesota Labor Relations Act was intended to apply to the
unionization of lay faculty members at parochial schools and that
allowing lay faculty members to collectively bargain did not create an
"impermissible entanglement" between government and religion, and so
did not violate the Establishment Clause.32 1
In a similar vein, the Second Circuit has held that the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act 322 was applicable to age
318. NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
1295 (1992).
319. Id. at 1302-06.
320. Id. at 1302-06. See also Catholic Social Servs., Diocese of Bellville, 355 N.L.R.B.
929 (2010), in which the NLRB exercised jurisdiction over a non-profit licensed child
care facility operated by Catholic Social Services, a not-for-profit Illinois business
corporation.
321. Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857
(Minn. 1992). As the court stated,
We decline to categorize this minimal responsibility as excessive entanglement.
Allowing lay teachers, almost all of whom are Catholic, to bargain collectively
will not alter or impinge on the religious character of the school. The first
amendment wall of separation between church and state does not prohibit
limited governmental regulation of purely secular aspects of a church school's
operation.
Id. at 864. The court also held that this "limited governmental regulation of purely secular
aspects of a church school's operation" under a generally applicable law would not
violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 862.
322. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
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discrimination claims brought by a lay teacher against his parochial
school employer. 23 In holding that the application of the law to such
claims did not violate the Establishment Clause, the court emphasized
that the sole question in an age discrimination case was whether an
employee had been unjustly discriminated against because of age. 3 24 No
Establishment Clause problem would be presented when the parochial
school employer asserted that the employee was discharged not because
of his age but for religiously based reasons. In such a case, the court
cannot inquire into the plausibility of the religiously based reasons. The
inquiry is limited to the question of whether, in fact, the employee was
discharged for the asserted religiously based reasons or because of his
age. 325 The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in an age
discrimination claim brought by the administrator of a Jewish
synagogue.326
These cases have not been qualified by subsequent cases and are not
affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor, since they
involved only lay employees of a religious institution. As these cases
indicate, the mere fact that a court or governmental agency exercises
jurisdiction over employment relations at a religious institution does not
necessarily create an entanglement problem. An entanglement problem
only arises when the court or agency either applies the law to invalidate
an action that was religiously based or is required to interpret religious
doctrine to resolve the particular dispute. Such a situation occurred in a
case where a Catholic nun who had been denied tenure in the Canon Law
department of the Catholic University of America brought a Title VII sex
discrimination claim against the university. 32 7 The District of Columbia
Circuit concluded that the Establishment Clause precluded the civil
courts from determining the validity of the claim, both because in so
doing they would be required to evaluate the teacher's scholarship and
her teaching of religious doctrine and because the inquiry itself would
intrude into the church's ability to make religious judgments about its
officials.328 By the same token, both the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise clause interact to protect the decision of a religious
organization to terminate an employee who has engaged in conduct that
323. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993).
324. Id. at 170.
325. Id. at 169-71. In this case, the school claimed that the employee was not
discharged because of his age, but because he failed to perform his religious duties. Id. at
168. The court noted that this defense involved the determination of a factual question,
which could be resolved "without putting into issue the validity or truthfulness of
Catholic religious teaching." Id. at 172.
326. Weissman v. Congregation Sharre Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 1994).
327. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
328. Id.
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violates the essential tenets of the religion and so renders the employee
unfit to advance the organization's religious mission, such as when a
teacher at a Catholic parochial school, who had been divorced and had
not obtained annulment of her prior marriage in the Catholic Church,
remarried a man who had been baptized as a Catholic,3 29 or when a
teacher at a Catholic parochial school engaged in sexual relations outside
of marriage.330
A third application of the excessive entanglement principle precludes
the government from protecting religiously based activity when, in order
to do so, it must enforce the requirements of religious law. This
application of the excessive entanglement principle has been involved in
lower court cases invalidating laws prohibiting the fraudulent sale of
kosher food. 3 3 1 Kosher food has been prepared in compliance with the
Orthodox Jewish religious rules and dietary laws. 332 In order to
determine whether or not particular food has been prepared in
compliance with Orthodox Jewish religious rules and dietary laws,
government officials must either apply Jewish religious law or delegate
329. See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991), in which the teacher was a
Protestant and brought a religious discrimination claim under Title VII. Title VII contains
a "religious entity" exception, under which religious organizations and religious schools
may limit employment to persons of their religion. Id. at 945-46. But if the religious
organization or religious entity does not limit employment to persons of their own
religion, it may not avoid the application of Title VII. Id. In this case, the Third Circuit, in
order to avoid a serious constitutional question, construed the "religious entity" exception
very broadly to cover an employee's conformity with the religious entity's religious
beliefs. Id. at 945.
330. Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1996). However,
if the teacher was a woman and became pregnant as a result of having sexual relations
outside of marriage, she is entitled to show that she was discharged because of her
pregnancy and not because she had sex outside of marriage, so that her discharge would
violate the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). She can make
such a showing by proving that the policy against having sex outside of marriage was
enforced only against pregnant women and not against men or against women who were
not pregnant. Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2000). In a
very recent and post-Hosanna-Tabor case, an unmarried, non-Catholic technology
coordinator at a Catholic parochial school was terminated because she became pregnant
by means of artificial insemination. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11 -CV-
00251, 2012 WL 1068165 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012). The school contended that
becoming pregnant by means of artificial insemination was a violation of Catholic
religious doctrine. Id. The court held that the "ministerial exception" did not apply to bar
her claims and that for purposes of the school's motion to dismiss, she had made out a
plausible claim of pregnancy discrimination. Id. The court subsequently held that the case
could proceed to trial on the issue of whether the plausible justification for the plaintiffs
termination was equally applied to male employees. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati,
No. 1:1 1-CV-00251, 2013 WL 360355 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013).
331. See Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir.
1995); see also Ran-Dav's Cnty. Kosher v. State, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992).
332. See MICHAEL A. FISHBANE, JUDAISM 144 (1987).
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the determination to Orthodox Jewish rabbis. Either way, there has been
an impermissible entanglement between government and religion.
However, consistent with the Establishment Clause, the government
could prohibit the fraudulent display of the kosher seal of approval that is
placed on food products after they have been certified as kosher by an
Orthodox Jewish rabbi. In such a case, the court or agency would only
have to determine the factual question of whether the product had been
certified as kosher by an Orthodox Jewish rabbi. In addition, the law
would serve the secular purpose of preventing consumer fraud by the
sale of products fraudulently labeled as having the kosher seal.
Our review of the cases in this area indicates that the excessive
entanglement principle prohibits the government from making
determinations of religious doctrine and from evaluating or enforcing
religious doctrine. As the recently decided Hosanna-Tabor case makes
clear, it also prohibits the government from interfering with the freedom
of religious organizations to "select and control who will be minister to
the faithful" and to implement their religious values in their operations
and programs. 333 However, with these important exceptions, the
excessive entanglement principle does not constrain the ability of the
government to apply generally applicable laws to regulate the activities
of religious organizations.334
E. Preference for Religion
Because the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is that
the Establishment Clause commands complete official neutrality toward
religion, it necessarily follows that the government cannot favor religion
over non-religion, and it cannot favor one religion over another
religion.335 Wile cases in which the government has acted to favor one
religion over another are fairly rare,336 there have been a number of
333. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709
(2012).
334. Id.
335. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985); see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (stating the classic definition of non-establishment in Everson:
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another").
336. The only Supreme Court case that clearly falls into this category is Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), which involved a state law requiring charitable
organizations to register but exempting organizations that received less than half their
finds from members. The law was held unconstitutional as applied to the required
registration of a religious organization that received more than half of its funds from non-
members. See id. at 230-32. The "half the funds from non-members" rule was
characterized by the Court as creating a preference between religions, and so it violated
the Establishment Clause. See id. at 255.
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Supreme Court cases in which the Court found an Establishment Clause
violation because the government was expressly giving preference to
religion over non-religion. These cases include the following: a state law
providing an exemption from the state sales tax for religious
periodicals;... a state law giving churches the power to prevent the
issuance of a liquor license to a business that would be located within
500 feet of the church;3 38 a state law setting up a special school district
embracing the boundaries of a religious community; 339 and a state law
entitling an employee to take off work on the day that the employee
observed as the Sabbath.340 In this regard, the Establishment Clause does
not permit the government to prefer religion over non-religion on the
ground that, by so doing, the government is making an "accommodation"
for religion.341 Stated simply, precisely because the overriding principle
of the Establishment Clause is one of complete official neutrality toward
religion, the Establishment Clause does not permit any "accommodation"
342for religion.
However, while the Establishment Clause precludes the government
from giving any preference to religion over non-religion, the overriding
principle of complete official neutrality toward religion also means that
the government is not required to be hostile to religion. As we have
discussed previously, under the subsidiary doctrine of the non-
discriminatory inclusion of religion, the inclusion of the religious with
the secular in the receipt of governmental benefits does not necessarily
violate the Establishment Clause, and the Court has gone quite far in
337. Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
338. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
339. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
340. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). The effect of the law
was to give a preference for religion, as the only employees who could choose their day
off were employees who could say that they observed that day as their Sabbath. Id. There
was no requirement that their religion precluded them from working on the Sabbath or
that they used the Sabbath day for religious purposes. Id. Thus, the law was in no way
precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of employees whose religion precluded
them from working on the Sabbath. Id.
341. Id.
342. But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding as an
"accommodation for religion" a public school's "released time" program under which
students could leave the school for a specified period of time during the school day to
receive religious instruction in non-school facilities). The result is clearly inconsistent
with later-decided cases such as Thornton, which hold that the government cannot give
any preference to religion under the guise of making an "accommodation" for religion.
See Thornton, 472 U.S. 703. The Court has had no occasion to reconsider Zorach in more
recent years, since these kinds of "released time" programs have pretty much been
eliminated from the public schools. In any event, Zorach has no precedential
significance, and if it survives, it is limited to its precise facts.
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upholding the constitutionality of such inclusions.343 Thus, some of the
preferences for religion that the Court has found unconstitutional could
have been sustained if the benefit involved had also been provided to
similarly situated non-religious groups. A state can provide a sales tax
exemption for all non-profit periodicals, including religious ones. Zoning
laws frequently prohibit the location of businesses serving liquor or
providing "adult entertainment" near residences, churches, schools, and
similar places. If a state wants to enable employees to take off work on
the day that the employee observes as the Sabbath, it can do so by giving
all employees the right to choose a day off from work. Again, what the
Establishment Clause prohibits is a preference for religion over non-
religion. It does not, as such, prohibit the government from including the
religious with the secular in the receipt of governmental benefits.
A different question is presented when the government takes action
that is precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals
and religious institutions. We have previously discussed the subsidiary
doctrine of accommodation for religious freedom, but not for religion.
Under this subsidiary doctrine, the government may take action that is
precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and
religious institutions.3" I discussed the application of this doctrine at
length in the original article3 45 and have brought it up to date in a more
recent article.346 I now want to elaborate somewhat on this discussion and
to specifically include a discussion of the 2005 case of Cutter v.
Wilkinson, in which the Court made it absolutely clear that
governmental action that is precisely tailored to protect the religious
freedom of individuals and religious institutions does not violate the
Establishment Clause.
The reason that this is so is because the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause operate in tandem, and the objective of the Religion
Clauses, taken together, is to promote religious freedom. Religious
freedom is thus a favored constitutional value, and it would be
inconsistent with the overriding purpose of the Religion Clauses, taken
together, for the Court to hold that the Establishment Clause necessarily
precludes the government from acting to protect the religious freedom of
individuals and religious institutions. It is irrelevant in this regard that the
343. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. The application of this subsidiary
doctrine has led the Court to uphold a substantial number of governmental programs
providing aid to children and parents that include children attending parochial schools
and their parents. See supra notes 137-200 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
345. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1422, 1437.
346. See Robert A. Sedler, Essay: The Constitutional Protection of Religious Freedom
Under the American Constitution, 53 WAYNE L. REv. 817, 826-32 (2007).
347. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
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failure of the government to take such action and that the application of
facially neutral laws to the religiously based conduct of individuals and
religious institutions would not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The
measure of what the government cannot constitutionally do is not the
measure of what the government is constitutionally permitted to do. So
long as the government's action is precisely tailored to protect the
religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions, that action
advances the overriding purpose of the Religion Clauses, taken as a
whole, and so does not violate the Establishment Clause. Moreover,
because the government's action advances the overriding purpose of the
Religion Clauses, taken as a whole, and because religious freedom is a
favored constitutional value, it does not matter that such action has the
effect of preferring religious based activity to other kinds of activity and
of providing a religiously based exemption from generally applicable
laws.348
In order to satisfy the standard of "precisely tailored to protect the
religious freedom of an individual or religious institution," the action
must be directed toward obviating an interference with religious
freedom. An interference with an individual's religious freedom occurs
when the individual is prevented from doing something that his/her
religion requires, such as when a member of the Native American church
is prohibited from using peyote in a religious ceremony, 3 49 or when
someone is compelled to do something that the person's religion
prohibits, such as when a Sabbatarian is required to work on Saturday. 350
An interference with the freedom of a religious institution occurs when
348. For an interesting discussion of what the author of the writing calls "religious
accommodation" and an effort to summarize the Supreme Court's decisions in this area
in terms of "black letter rules for religious accommodation," see Carl H. Esbeck, When
Accommodations for Religion Violate the Establishment Clause: Regularizing the
Supreme Court's Analysis, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 359 (2007).
349. The prohibition on the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies of the Native
American Church has been held not to violate the Free Exercise Clause, since the Free
Exercise Clause does not require that the government exempt religiously-based conduct
from neutral and generally applicable laws. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
350. The Court has held that the denial of unemployment compensation to a
Sabbatarian who refused Saturday work and to a person who, on religious grounds,
refused to work in weapons production violated the Free Exercise Clause. See Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Smith, the Court distinguished these cases, noting that the
decisions "stand for the proposition that where the state has in place a system of
individualized exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious
hardship' without compelling reason." Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. The effect of this
distinction is to limit the holding of these cases to the "discriminatory exclusion of
religion" from a system of individualized exemptions.
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the law prevents the institution from carrying out its religious function,
such as when a law prohibits a religious institution from employing only
its adherents in the religious activities of the institution or when a zoning
law prohibits the construction of a religious facility in a residential
area.3 5'
The proposition that the government may take action to protect the
religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions was best
illustrated at the time of the original article by the Supreme Court cases
dealing with Title VIi's "religious entities" and "reasonable
accommodation" provisions. Under the "religious entities" exemption,
religious organizations are exempted from Title VII's religious
discrimination prohibition with respect to employing individuals of the
same religion to carry out the work of the organization. 3 52 In Corporation
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 5 the Court unanimously held that this exemption did not
violate the Establishment Clause, even as applied to a religious
organization's non-profit, secular activities.354 The Court first noted that
the government may in some circumstances accommodate religious
practices without violating the Establishment Clause and that the limits
of permissible accommodation were not coextensive with the
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. As the Court
stated, "[t]here is ample room under the Establishment Clause for
'benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without interference."' 355 The Court then
pointed out that it was a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate
significant governmental interference with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions and that a
law was not unconstitutional simply because it allowed churches to
advance religion, which is their very purpose. 3 56 Finally, the Court
concluded that there was no constitutional objection to the exemption
singling out religious entities for a benefit. The Court stated, "Where, as
here, the government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation
351. See generally Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
352. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994). See also Esbeck, supra note 348.
353. 483 U.S. at 339. The church operated a gymnasium, open to the public, and
required that its employees be church members in good standing.
353. Id. at 334.
354. Id.
356. Id. at 335-36.
356. Id. at 335-36.
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that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the
exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities."35 7
Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination requires that
employers make a "reasonable accommodation" for an employee's
religious beliefs, as long as this can be done without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business. In Trans World Airlines v.
Harrison, 3 the Court interpreted "reasonable accommodation" very
narrowly by holding that an employer was not required to accommodate
a Sabbatarian's effort to avoid Saturday work when this would require
the employer to disregard the seniority system established by the
collective bargaining agreement. 36 0 Had the employer been required to do
so, "the privilege of having Saturdays off would be allocated according
to religious beliefs," and in the absence of clear statutory or legislative
history to the contrary, the Court was unwilling to construe the law to
"require an employer to discriminate against some employees in order to
enable others to observe their Sabbath." 3 6 As Hardison indicates, in the
employment context, an effort to protect one employee's religious
freedom may impose substantial costs on other employees, and,
therefore, a narrow interpretation of "reasonable accommodation" was
necessary in order to prevent a resulting preference for religion over non-
religion and to satisfy the constitutionally required "precisely tailored"
standard. An example of a precisely tailored "reasonable
accommodation" is the "substituted charity" provision of federal labor
relations law that enables persons who have religious objections to
joining unions to avoid paying union dues or representation fees and
instead make a charitable contribution in an equivalent amount.3 62
357. Id. at 338. Justice Brennan, concurring, said that while the exemption should
ideally be limited to the organization's religious activities, a court's determination of
whether a particular activity was "religious" or "secular" would require ongoing
governmental entanglement in religious affairs and could chill the organization's
religious activity. Presiding Bishiop, 483 U.S. at 343-44 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor, concurring, suggested that the exemption might be unconstitutional as
applied to the organization's profit-making enterprises and emphasized that this question
was not before the Court in that case. Id. at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
358. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
359. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
360. Id. at 84.
361. Id. at 84-85.
362. 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1994). See Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239,
1242 (9th Cir. 1981). Another example of a reasonable accommodation is found in EEOC
v. Ilona ofHungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569 (7th Cir. 1997), in which two Jewish employees
of a skin care salon had made a request two weeks in advance for time off from work on
Yom Kippur, the holiest Jewish holiday, when the employer could have reassigned or
rescheduled their previously booked appointments.
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In most of the cases in which the government has acted to protect the
religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions, the
government's actions do not impose substantial costs on others. When
the government does not deny unemployment compensation to a
Sabbatarian who refuses Saturday work, for example, the costs of this
accommodation are borne entirely by the government itself.36 3 So too,
when Sunday closing laws were in effect, an exemption for Sabbatarians
from those laws merely equalized the competitive situation for
Sabbatarians and non-Sabbatarians. Both were required to close their
businesses for one day, the Sabbatarian on Saturday and the non-
Sabbatarian on Sunday.
The Supreme Court's decision in Presiding Bishop was followed by
a number of lower court cases upholding governmental actions designed
to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions.
Usually these actions involved religiously based exemptions from
generally applicable laws. 36 5 Sometimes they favored a single religious
group, but when this was so, it was because only that group had
demonstrated that compliance with the law would substantially interfere
with its religious freedom. These cases include the following: an
exemption from social security self-employment taxes for members of
religious sects that have tenets opposed to participation in the social
security system and that provide reasonable support for their dependent
members; 366 a zoning law exception that permitted non-profit day care
363. This accommodation is required by the Free Exercise Clause. See Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
364. The Court had held that Sunday closing laws did not violate the Establishment
Clause, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and that they did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause as applied to a Sabbatarian who was required to close his store on
Sunday after closing it on Saturday for religious reasons, see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfeld, the Court noted that a number of states did provide such
an exemption and stated that "this may well be the wiser solution to the problem." Id. at
608. The exemption was upheld in a number of state court cases. See, e.g., Kentucky v.
Arlan's Dep't Store, 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 218 (1962).
365. It will be recalled that in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did
not require that the government exempt religiously based conduct from neutral and
generally applicable laws (in that case, the use of an illegal substance, peyote, in the
religious ceremonies of the Native American church).
366. See Droz v. Comm'r, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995). The exemption extends only
to self-employed taxpayers. In United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), the Court held
that the imposition of social security taxes on an Amish employer who had failed to pay
his own taxes and failed to withhold the taxes from the wages of his Amish employees
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The plaintiff in Droz claimed that he had
religious objections to paying the social security self-employment tax; however, he was
not entitled to assert the objection under the law because he was not a member of a
recognized sect. Droz, 48 F.3d at 1122. The decision in Lee foreclosed his free exercise
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facilities and nursery schools to operate in church buildings located in
residential neighborhoods;3 67 an exemption from federal substance abuse
laws and eagle protection laws for the use of peyote and eagle feathers in
the religious ceremonies of Native-American tribes;368 and an exemption
claim. Id. at 1123. In Lee, the Court had noted that the self-employed exemption only
provided for a narrow category exemption that was readily identifiable, in that "[s]elf-
employed persons in a religious community having its own 'welfare' system are
distinguishable from the generality of wage earners employed by others." Lee, 455 U.S.
at 260-261. The plaintiff's Establishment Clause challenge in Droz was based on the
argument that exemption favored one religion over another. Droz, 48 F.3d at 1122. The
court rejected the challenge, saying that the exemption was for an organization that had
its own welfare system and so did not discriminate between religions based on religious
beliefs. Id. at 1124.
367. Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1993). The exemption was
contained in a zoning law that permitted churches in areas otherwise zoned as single
family residential. Id. at 486-87. The law was challenged by the owner of commercial
day care facilities who wanted to operate in residential neighborhoods. Id. The city
justified the exemption as being related to avoiding entanglement with the decision-
making processes of a religious organization. In upholding the ordinance, the Seventh
Circuit relied heavily on Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). See id. at 490-92.
368. See Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991)
(peyote exemption); Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.
1992) (eagle feathers exemption). In these cases, the exemptions for the use of peyote and
eagle feathers in the religious ceremonies of Native American tribes were challenged as
constituting a religious preference by other groups seeking to use peyote and eagle
feathers for religious purposes. The courts were able to avoid the religious preference
claim by finding that the exemption was based on the sovereignty of Native American
tribes and their special relationship with the federal government. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d at
1214-16; Rupert, 957 F.2d at 33-35. Cf Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (finding
that a preference for Native Americans in employment at the Bureau of Indian Affairs
does not constitute national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII). If the peyote
exemption, for example, had been for all religious groups, as opposed to ordinary drug
users, this would be constitutionally permissible as a means of protecting the religious
freedom of individuals and religious institutions. See Thornburgh, 922 F.2d at 1214-18.
In Gonzales v. 0 Cento Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
433 (2006) (discussed infra note 385), the Court referred to "the well-established peyote
exception" and noted that this exception "undermines the Government's broader
contention that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory system that
admits of no exceptions."
During Prohibition, there was an exemption for sacramental wine used in
religious services. In speaking of this exemption, Professor Laycock has observed that
this and similar exemptions were fully consistent with "substantive neutrality" toward
religion. Laycock, supra note 28, at 1003.
To prohibit the consumption of alcohol, without an exception for religious
rituals, is to flatly prohibit important religious practices. Such a prohibition
would discourage religious practices in the most coercive possible way-by
criminalizing it. Many believers would abandon their religious practice; some
would defy the law; some would go to jail. Such a law would be a massive
departure from substantive neutrality.
Id.
662 [Vol. 59:589
2013] UNDERSTANDING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
for Amish buggies from the requirement that slow-moving vehicles
display a special emblem.3 69
It also cannot be disputed that the government may, consistent with
the Establishment Clause, take actions that are precisely tailored to
protect the religious freedom of individuals who are subject to
governmental control. A public school system may try to protect the
religious freedom of public school students by respecting religious
prohibitions against immodest dress or nakedness in the presence of
others and not requiring these students to wear gym clothes or to
shower. 370 Likewise, the military and the prison system may try to
accommodate the religious needs of persons under their control by
providing them with chaplains, 37n releasing them for religious services,
excusing them from uniform requirements, 3 72 and enabling them to
observe dietary restrictions.
This brings us to the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Cutter v.
Wilkinson,37 3 in which the Court unanimously held that the Establishment
Clause did not prevent Congress from requiring that prison officials
make a "reasonable accommodation" for the religious practices of their
inmates. Such an accommodation was required by the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 37 4 which
provides, inter alia, that institutional regulations that impose a
substantial burden on the religious practices of institutionalized persons
are invalid unless they can be justified under the rigorous compelling
governmental interest standard. RLUIPA was enacted under the spending
power and applies only to state and local governmental programs and
369. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (holding that such an
exemption was required by the state constitution and that the exemption did not violate
the Establishment Clause). see also the older lower court case of Jones v. Butz, 374 F.
Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), in which the court upheld an exemption from the federal
Humane Slaughter Law, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907 (1970), for Jewish Kosher religious
slaughter and now for Muslim Halal religious slaughter and that of all religious faiths that
use the severance of the carotid artery method of slaughter.
370. Muslim students must say prayers during the school day. Thus, it is permissible
for the public schools both to excuse the students from class so that they can say these
prayers and to provide a private place for them to do so. This has long been the practice
of the Dearborn, Michigan, school system, which enrolls a large number of Muslim
students.
371. See, e.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting an
Establishment Clause challenge to the military chaplaincy).
372. Congress has by statute, 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994), overturned the "headgear
regulation" upheld in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), against a Free
Exercise challenge by an Orthodox Jewish officer, who was prohibited by the regulation
from wearing a religiously required skullcap.
373. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
374. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)(2) to (2) (2005).
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activities receiving federal assistance.3 7 In Cutter, the Sixth Circuit had
held that the application of RLIUPA to the refusal of a state prison to
make an exception to prison regulations so as to permit a non-traditional
religious sect to hold religious services and engage in religious activities
violated the Establishment Clause by favoring religious rights over other
fundamental rights without any showing that religious rights were at any
greater risk of deprivation in the prison context.376
The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion, holding that
the application of RLIUPA to protect the religious practices of the prison
inmates that were at issue in that case did not violate the Establishment
Clause. The Court first noted that it "has long recognized that the
government may . . . accommodate religious practices . . . without
violating the Establishment Clause"377 and that "there is room for play in
the joints between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate religion beyond Free
Exercise requirements without offense to the Establishment Clause." 37 8 It
then noted that Congress had documented in hearings spanning three
years that "frivolous or arbitrary" barriers impeded institutionalized
375. RLUIPA was Congress' response to the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), in which the Court overturned the major part of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4
(2005). Congress enacted RFRA in response to the Court's decision in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), holding that
the Free Exercise Clause did not require that the government exempt religiously based
conduct from neutral and generally applicable laws. RFRA applied to all federal and state
laws and provided that whenever any law "substantially burdened" a person's exercise of
religion, the rigorous compelling governmental interest test applied, so that the
government had to demonstrate that the law was in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and that it was the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.
The compelling governmental interest test applied even if the "substantial burden" on the
person's exercise of religion resulted from a rule of general applicability. Id. In Boerne,
the Court held that the Act was unconstitutional in its application to the states as being
beyond Congress' enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. RLIUPA was a much narrower law, enacted under the spending
power and applicable only to state and local programs and activities receiving federal
assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc to cc-5 (2005).
376. See Cutter, 423 F.3d at 582 (6th Cir.), rev'd., 544 U.S. 709 (2005). The Seventh
and Ninth Circuits, by contrast, had held that the application of RLIUPA in the prison
context did not violate the Establishment Clause, because it was constitutional for
Congress to lift a burden on religious worship in prisons without affording corresponding
protection to the secular activities of non-religious prisoners. See Charles v. Verhagen,
348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).
377. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713.
378. Id. The Court cited Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004), in which it had
held that although the state would not be violating the Establishment Clause if it
permitted state scholarship funds to be used for theology courses, the state did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause by prohibiting the use of state funds for this purpose. Cutter,
544 U.S. at 718.
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persons' religious exercise, and it found as a fact that on its face
RLIUPA "qualifies as a permissible legislative accommodation of
religion that is not barred by the Establishment Clause."379 This was so
because RLIJPA "alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on
private religious exercise" and "protects institutionalized persons who
are unable to freely attend to their religious needs and are therefore
dependent on the government's permission and accommodation for
exercise of their religion." 380 Moreover, RLIUPA would be applied in an
"appropriately balanced way, with particular sensitivity to security
concerns." 38 ' Finally, the Court concluded that the Sixth Circuit had
misunderstood the Court's precedents when it held that the government
could not give greater protection to religious rights than to other
constitutionally protected rights. If this were the law, said the Court, "all
manner of religious accommodations would fail," and the Court had held
in other cases, most notably Presiding Bishop, 382 that religious
accommodations need not "come packaged with benefits to secular
entities."383
The Court thus has upheld against Establishment Clause challenge
the provisions of RLUIPA requiring the state to make a reasonable
accommodation for the religious needs of institutionalized persons.384
379. Id. at716.
380. Id. at 720.
381. Id. at 722.
382. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
383. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 327 (citing Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 338).
384. The Supreme Court's decision in Cutter upholding the constitutionality of the
institutionalized persons provisions of RLUIPA necessarily upholds the parallel land use
provisions of RLUIPA. See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 504
F.3d 338, 353-56 (2d Cir. 2007). There are four such provisions. One provision provides
that if a land use regulation substantially burdens the free exercise of religion, the
government must show that the burden serves a compelling governmental interest by the
least restrictive means. Two provisions prohibit discrimination against religious
institutions. And one provision deals with exclusion by providing that a land use
regulation may not totally exclude religious assemblies or unreasonably limit religious
assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction. The substantial burden and
equal terms provisions have been the most important and the most frequently litigated.
See also the summary of the provisions and the discussion in Douglas Laycock and Luke
W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1021, 1023 (2012). No cases involving the land use provisions of RLUIPA have yet
reached the Supreme Court. In commenting on the lower court RLUIPA cases, Laycock
and Goodrich observed as follows:
Over the twelve years since its enactment, RLUIPA has proven its worth.
Churches have brought numerous successful lawsuits protecting their core First
Amendment rights and many cases have settled. Local officials are now on
notice that they cannot treat churches as a disfavored land use, despite the
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The Court's decision in Cutter strongly affirms that proposition that the
government can, consistent with the Establishment Clause, take action
that is precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals
and religious institutions."'
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have revisited the "law of the Establishment Clause"
that I first explored some sixteen years earlier. In the earlier article, I
issues with NIMBY neighbors, tax collection, or commercial districts, or fear
of Muslims or other prejudices among their constituents.
Id. at 2071. For recent illustrative cases involving RLUIPA challenges to land use
regulation, see Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 706
F.3d 548 (4th Cir. 2013), Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2012),
and Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.
2011).
385. RFRA also remains in effect to the extent that it can constitutionally be applied to
federal laws and regulations. In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), the Court applied RFRA to invalidate the application of
Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2005), to the use of
hoasca, a tea containing a hallucinogen, in the religious practices of a very small sect in
the United States. The Court held that RFRA and RLIUPA require case-by-case
consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable rules and that the
government bears the burden of demonstrating that serious harm would result from the
granting of specific exemptions to particular religious claimants. Id. The government
could not sustain its burden in this case, just as the state prison system could not sustain
its burden in Cutter. Id.
The Court has very recently granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the
circuits on the question of whether closely held, family, for-profit corporations operated
according to religious principles can assert a RFRA challenge to provisions of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act that require group insurance plans, such as those
provided to their employees by these corporations, to provide coverage without cost-
sharing for preventive care and screening for women, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), which,
under guidelines created by the Health Resources and Services Administration, include
approved contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures. Hobby Lobby Stores v.
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. (2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). One of
the family corporations objected on religious grounds to providing coverage for all
contraceptives and the other objected on religious grounds to providing coverage for the
"morning after pill" and the "week after pill." Id. The Tenth Circuit held in a 5-3 en banc
decision that the corporation was covered by RFRA and that the requirement that they
provide contraception coverage for their employees violated their rights under RFRA and
the Free Exercise Clause. Id. The Third Circuit held in a 2-1 decision that a for-profit,
secular corporation could not engage in the exercise of religion under RFRA or the Free
Exercise Clause and that the owners did not have any claim because compliance with the
health coverage mandate was placed on the corporation and not on the owners. Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377
(3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct.
678 (2013).
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developed the thesis that when one looked at the Establishment Clause
from the perspective of constitutional litigation, it was indeed possible to
ascertain what I referred to as "the law of the Establishment Clause," and
that the "law of the Establishment Clause" was not at all difficult to
understand or to apply to the resolution of the Establishment Clause
issues that arise in practice. It is the "law of the Establishment Clause"
that is used by litigating lawyers and by the courts-including the
Supreme Court-to litigate and resolve these issues.
In that article, I tried to explain the nature and operation of the "law
of the Establishment Clause." I contended that the "law of the
Establishment Clause" consisted of four components: (1) the overriding
principle of complete official neutrality toward religion; (2) three
operative principles, the three prongs of the Lemon test; (3) subsidiary
doctrines, mostly related to the application of the second Lemon "effect
of advancing religion" principle; and (4), most importantly, the
precedents in what I identified as the five major areas of Establishment
Clause litigation. It was my submission that as of that time, when the
"law of the Establishment Clause" had been developing for almost fifty
years, the "law of the Establishment Clause" could be considered to be
fairly settled, and that the new Establishment Clause issues that would
arise would be litigated and resolved within the analytical framework of
the existing principles, doctrines, and precedents.
The most salient feature of my revisit of the "law of the
Establishment Clause" is that in the fifteen-year period between 1997
and the end of the Court's last Term in 2012, there have been only seven
cases in which the Supreme Court decided an Establishment Clause
issue, including the Court's most recent decision, which was based on
both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. I think that
it is fair to say that these cases were litigated and resolved within the
analytical framework of the existing principles, doctrines, and
precedents.
Two of these cases involved financial aid to religion, and in both
cases, a Court majority held that the particular form of financial aid-in
one case, the inclusion of parochial school students with public school
students in the loan of computers and other instructional materials, and in
the other, the inclusion of vouchers for tuition at parochial schools along
with other financial assistance for the parents of children attending
underperforming schools-did not violate the Establishment Clause. 38 6
These cases involved the application of the doctrine of the non-
discriminatory inclusion of religion 38 7 and the precedents distinguishing
386. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639 (2002). See supra notes 144-200 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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between constitutionally impermissible "aid to parochial schools" and
constitutionally permissible "aid to the child" attending parochial schools
and to the parents of such children. 38 8 The effect of these decisions has
been to permit the government to provide significant financial assistance
to the educational function of parochial schools, so long as this assistance
takes the form of providing the same benefits to children attending both
public and parochial schools and the parents of such children. This result
is consistent with the doctrine of the non-discriminatory inclusion of
religion.
Two of the cases, decided the same day, involved public displays
that included a religious symbol, here the Ten Commandments. 389
Applying the first Lemon principle-that in order for governmental
action to be upheld under the Establishment Clause, the action must have
a secular legislative purpose-the Court held in one of the cases that the
display was unconstitutional because it was motivated by a religious
purpose.3 90 The constitutional question with respect to the display in the
other case involved the second Lemon principle (that in order for
governmental action to be upheld under the Establishment Clause, it
cannot have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion), the
resulting primary effect and incidental benefit doctrine, 392 and the
Court's precedents dealing with the constitutionality of governmental
displays that include religious symbols.393 Applying these components of
the "law of the Establishment Clause," the Court concluded that the
inclusion of a Ten Commandments monument-which was presented to
the State of Texas by a private civic organization in 1961 and located in a
display on a twenty-two acre area of the Texas state capitol's grounds
that contained seventeen monuments and historical markers
"commemorating the people, ideals and events that compose Texan
identity"-did not violate the Establishment Clause.394 The effect of this
decision is that when the display includes secular symbols, it will likely
be held not to violate the Establishment Clause because it will not be
sending a message of endorsement of religion. The display will be held
unconstitutional if it can be shown that the display was motivated by a
religious purpose or if the display consisted only of a religious symbol,
388. See supra notes 127-200 and accompanying text.
389. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677 (2005).
390. See supra note 253-55 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
393. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573 (1989). See supra notes 222-71 and accompanying text.
394. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). See supra notes 256-71 and
accompanying text.
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such as a nativity scene or a Ten Commandments monument standing
alone, because it will then convey a message of endorsement of religion.
The constitutional permissibility of displays containing a religious
symbol has now been made very clear by these two decisions.
The holdings in the remaining three cases again involved the Court's
application of the components of the "law of the Establishment Clause."
The Court applied its precedents dealing with prayers in the public
schools 395 to hold violative of the Establishment Clause a school
district's policy authorizing a student election to determine whether the
student body wanted to have a student deliver a "brief invocation and/or
message" at varsity football games. 39 6 The decision continues the line of
cases holding that all state-sponsored religious practices in the public
schools, including prayers at commencements and at athletic events,
violate the Establishment Clause. Next, applying the subsidiary doctrine
of accommodation for religious freedom but not for religion,39 7 the Court
upheld as "precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of an
individual" the provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) 3 9 8 requiring that prison officials make a
"reasonable accommodation" for the religious practices of their
inmates. 399 Finally, the Court applied the third Lemon "excessive
entanglement" principle 400 to hold that the Establishment Clause,
separate from the Free Exercise Clause, requires a "ministerial
exception" to federal civil rights laws that precluded the application of
those laws to invalidate the dismissal of a teacher at a private religious
school who had been given the status of a religious official by the
denomination operating the school. 4 0 1
The Court's decisions in these seven cases, I would submit, support
the proposition set forth in the earlier article that the "law of the
Establishment Clause" could be considered to be fairly settled and that
the new Establishment Clause issues that will arise will be litigated and
resolved within the analytical framework of the existing principles,
doctrines, and precedents.
The purpose of the Establishment Clause in the American
constitutional system is to protect religious freedom by requiring that the
395. See supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
396. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). See supra notes 115-117
and accompanying text.
397.See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
398. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2005).
399. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). See supra notes 373-85 and
accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
401. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012). See supra notes 286-309 and accompanying text.
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government "pursue a course of complete official neutrality toward
religion.'402 As Justice Douglas observed many years ago, while the
Establishment Clause "reflects the philosophy that Church and State
should be separated," "it does not say that in every and all respects there
shall be a separation of Church and State." Rather, "it studiously defines
the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or
union or dependency one on the other."403 It has been the function of the
"law of the Establishment Clause" to advance the philosophy of
separation of Church and State and to achieve the objective of "defining
the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or
union or dependency one on the other." It is my hope that in these two
writings, some sixteen years apart, I have demonstrated how the "law of
the Establishment Clause" has carried out this function and achieved this
objective.
402. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1981). The principle of complete official
neutrality toward religion is the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause. See
supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
403. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
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